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  INTRODUCTION   
Congress and the Supreme Court have been significantly at 
odds over intellectual property law throughout the early twenty-
first century. This institutional fracture is revealed here in an 
original dataset comprising every Supreme Court decision and 
statute passed by Congress concerning intellectual property law 
from 2002 to 2016. Though the divergence between legislative 
and judicial action has largely slipped below the radar, it speaks 
volumes about the contemporary political economy of intellec-
tual property law. Analysis of this legal activity also raises ques-
tions concerning interbranch separation of powers and majori-
tarian democracy, questions that spread well beyond intellectual 
property. 
Recent legislative and judicial actions concerning intellec-
tual property law reveal several stark trends. Congress has been 
remarkably hospitable to stronger intellectual property rights. 
Congress passed forty-three intellectual property laws during 
the time period in question. Of those that affected the substan-
tive strength of intellectual property rights, over 80% made 
rights stronger.1 These laws made it easier to acquire intellec-
tual property rights, broadened the scope of protection, and 
strengthened enforcement. The Supreme Court’s intellectual 
property jurisprudence, however, has moved largely in the oppo-
site direction. The Court decided forty-four intellectual property 
cases from the October 2002–2003 Term through the October 
2015–2016 Term, and of those that substantively affected the ex-
tent of rights, two-thirds weakened protection. 
 
 1. The use of the terms “stronger”  and “weaker”  refers solely to the 
strength (or weakness) of intellectual property rights from the perspective of 
the intellectual property rights owner. These terms do not indicate that a given 
law is more or less socially beneficial. 
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Differentiating this legislative and judicial action based on 
intellectual property subfield exposes additional nuance. While 
Congress has tended to strengthen intellectual property protec-
tion in patent, copyright, and trademark law, the Supreme Court 
has been generally antagonistic toward stronger patent and 
trademark rights, but highly receptive to increasing copyright 
protection. This differentiation indicates that the Supreme 
Court, at least, does not appear to view intellectual property law 
as a single, unified field. 
Most research to date has focused on the activity of one 
branch of government or in a single intellectual property field. 
Such approaches miss the insight provided by comparison and 
differentiation. The instant dataset provides a richer foundation 
for comprehending relations between the branches and across 
intellectual property fields, and consequently offers a more ro-
bust, empirically supported understanding of governmental in-
tellectual property activity in the modern age. For example, prior 
commentators have explained the Supreme Court’s patent deci-
sions as a reaction to concerns about patent trolls and against 
the Federal Circuit’s perceived excessive protection for patent 
rights.2 The instant dataset indicates that these explanations 
may not tell the full story. Analyzing the pattern of unanimity 
in the Court’s intellectual property decisions underscores that 
there appears to be something particular about both the patent 
and the trademark decisions, a pattern that would not result 
from the traditional patent-specific rationales. 
Over the period of study, the Supreme Court issued unani-
mous opinions in intellectual property cases at a rate almost 
twice that of its general docket. This difference was not uniform 
across intellectual property fields. The Supreme Court issued a 
unanimous decision in a remarkable 81% of patent and trade-
mark cases that substantively affected the strength of intellec-
tual property rights. The Court’s rate of unanimity in copyright 
cases (14%) and in patent and trademark cases that did not sub-
stantively affect the strength of intellectual property rights 
(37.5%) were in line with, or below, the Court’s average unanim-
ity rate of about 35% for the rest of its docket during this period.3 
Something has led the Court to reach unanimous agreement in 
an overwhelming percentage of substantive patent and trade-
mark decisions, but rarely in nonsubstantive decisions in those 
 
 2. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 3. Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 
100 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 781 (2015). 
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same fields or in copyright cases. As detailed in this Article, the 
data reveals several clues concerning what may be causing this 
disparity. 
The recent actions of Congress and the Supreme Court in 
intellectual property law also provide insight into the ideologi-
cal, political, and sociological influences that drive legal decision-
making in these branches of government. While legislator ideol-
ogy and constituent interest do not predict congressional intel-
lectual property activity, special interest group influence has 
greater explanatory power. Similarly, judicial ideology does not 
appear to drive intellectual property decisions at the Supreme 
Court, and traditionally conceived legal reasoning does not fare 
much better. Counterintuitively, popular opinion appears to play 
a previously unappreciated role in influencing the Supreme 
Court’s intellectual property jurisprudence. The direction of the 
potential causal relationship between popular opinion and Su-
preme Court’s intellectual property decisions is not entirely 
clear, but evidence from this study indicates that it is the result 
of the Justices being a part and parcel of the social dynamics of 
their lives, as opposed to intentionally shaping their jurispru-
dence to satisfy popular preferences.4 
Intellectual property decision-making during this time pe-
riod thus seems to contradict the conventional view of the appro-
priate roles of the branches of government in the United States. 
The Supreme Court, often perceived as the least democratically 
accountable branch, appears to be significantly affected by pop-
ular opinion on intellectual property rights. Congress, the 
branch of government theoretically most responsive to popular 
will, has displayed clear countermajoritarian tendencies. 
These discrepancies have meaningful consequences for legal 
efficiency, majoritarian democracy, and the development of in-
tellectual property law. Having two branches of government 
working at cross purposes can be an inefficient use of scarce gov-
ernment resources. Even more problematic, though the analysis 
suggests that the Supreme Court may step in to fill some of the 
gaps created by Congress’s failure to represent popular will, this 
gap-filling does not necessarily satisfy democratic principles. 
The Supreme Court can produce majoritarian outcomes, but it 
does not do so through majoritarian processes. This difference 
between means and ends should not be taken lightly. When the 
 
 4. See generally Craig Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward a Theory 
of Interpreting Precedents, 94 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2016) (discussing how social 
context can affect how a court’s opinion is interpreted). 
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Court cedes to popular will, it may be abdicating its constitu-
tional role of checking Congress and the President. This is a chal-
lenge for our constitutional system as it means that no branch is 
guarding against the potential tyranny of the majority. Such 
concerns may be less of an issue in intellectual property law than 
in fundamental rights cases, but the intellectual property cases 
analyzed here provide fresh evidence that this concern is a real 
one. 
This Article progresses in three parts. Part I develops and 
analyzes the Supreme Court and congressional legislation da-
taset. Every Supreme Court decision and every act of legislation 
by Congress concerning intellectual property law from 2002 to 
2016 was coded by multiple independent analysts to classify it 
as strengthening, weakening, or being neutral with respect to 
intellectual property rights. Analysis of these data reveal that 
Congress has uniformly strengthened rights while the Supreme 
Court has primarily weakened them. Part II examines the rea-
sons for this structure of intellectual property decision-making, 
and uncovers a somewhat puzzling result: the Supreme Court 
appears more responsive than Congress to popular opinion con-
cerning intellectual property rights. Part III explores the impli-
cations of these results for the future of intellectual property law 
and its ability to serve desired objectives. The findings have sig-
nificant implications beyond intellectual property law for the 
balance of power between the Legislative and Judicial Branches, 
and for how democracy functions in the United States. 
I.  SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESSIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ACTIVITY   
Though prior scholarship has examined congressional or ju-
dicial treatment of particular intellectual property domains in-
dividually, little attention has been paid to each branch’s ap-
proach to intellectual property law globally.5 The data analysis 
described in detail below indicates that there was a turning point 
in the Supreme Court’s intellectual property jurisprudence be-
ginning with the October 2002 Term.6 This turning point is 
marked both by the degree of attention that the Court directed 
 
 5. But see Matthew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual 
Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 829–51 (2009) (reporting 
an empirical study of all Supreme Court intellectual property cases from 1954 
to 2006, and commenting on the dearth of scholarship across intellectual prop-
erty domains). 
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
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towards intellectual property cases and by the substance of the 
Court’s decisions in such cases. For this reason, the present 
study focuses on comparing the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s 
intellectual property activity from July 1, 2002 to the present. 
The time period covered in this study was thus intentionally se-
lected to investigate the recent interbranch intellectual property 
dissensus. 
I constructed a database of every Supreme Court opinion im-
plicating patent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret issues 
from July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2016. The database entries 
are the Supreme Court’s final decision in each matter; certiorari 
dispositions are not included. I removed from the database any 
cases that, though referring to intellectual property law, did not 
actually decide any intellectual property issue. For example, Il-
linois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. concerned 
whether there should be a presumption of market power under 
antitrust law where the product in question is subject to patent 
protection.7 Though this case bears a relation to patent protec-
tion, its result did not turn on or affect patent law. The final Su-
preme Court database includes forty-four intellectual property 
decisions and is summarized in Appendix A. 
Using similar methods, I developed a database of every fed-
eral statute concerning patent, copyright, trademark, or trade 
secret rights during the same time period. As with the Supreme 
Court data, I removed statutes that did not actually affect pa-
tent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret doctrine. For exam-
ple, the Lanham Act is the primary statute providing for Federal 
trademark protection in the United States.8 Portions of the Lan-
ham Act regulate nontrademark activities, such as false adver-
tising.9 Legislation that affected only the false advertising por-
tions of the Lanham Act was excluded from the database. The 
final dataset includes forty-three legislative entries for the per-
tinent period and is summarized in Appendix B.10 The following 
sections analyze the contours of intellectual property activity in 
these Supreme Court and congressional datasets. 
 
 7. 547 U.S. 28, 28–29 (2006). 
 8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012). 
 9. Id. § 1125. 
 10. As discussed below, these forty-three entries derive from thirty-four 
acts, some of which affected multiple areas of intellectual property law. See in-
fra Part I.B. 
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A. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
The primary variable for analysis is whether a given Su-
preme Court decision or legislative action strengthened or weak-
ened intellectual property protection. Consistent with prior re-
search in this context, strengthened versus weakened refers to 
the extent of protection afforded to the intellectual property 
rights owner.11 Accordingly, Supreme Court decisions that make 
it easier to acquire intellectual property rights; broaden the 
scope of intellectual property protection; make it easier to prove 
infringement; or strengthen remedies for infringement are all 
considered to strengthen intellectual property protection. Deci-
sions that have the opposite effects weaken protection.12 
A number of the Supreme Court decisions are neutral in this 
regard. Neutral coding can occur for multiple reasons, such as 
procedural decisions that affect both intellectual property own-
ers and opposing parties in equivalent manners, or decisions 
that regulate ownership among competing claimants. An exam-
ple of the former type of neutral decision is Teva Pharmaceuti-
cals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.13 This case clarified the proper 
standard of appellate review for a district court’s factual findings 
made in patent claim construction.14 The Court held that the 
standard of review is clear error,15 a decision that neither 
strengthened nor weakened intellectual property owner rights 
 
 11. See Sag et al., supra note 5, at 828 (coding Supreme Court intellectual 
property cases based on whether the case was decided in favor of the party as-
serting the intellectual property right for a study of Justice ideology in intellec-
tual property decisions). 
 12. Consistent with the standard approach applied in analyzing the ideo-
logical direction of Supreme Court decisions, whether a given decision strength-
ened or weakened intellectual property rights was determined based on the net 
effect on intellectual property law with respect to the issue at hand, not based 
simply on whether there was a change from the status quo. See, e.g., Lee Epstein 
& Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possi-
bly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 272 (2010) (apply-
ing this methodology to code decisions as liberal versus conservative); Isaac 
Unah et al., U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Public Mood, 30 J.L. & POL. 293, 
307–10 (2015) (same); The Supreme Court Database, WASH. U. L. SCH., su-
premecourtdatabase.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) (same). Thus, Eldred v. Ash-
croft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), is coded as strengthening intellectual property rights 
because it upheld the Copyright Term Extension Act against a constitutional 
challenge. As the statutory name implies, the Copyright Term Extension Act 
extended owner ’s copyright terms. Though upholding the law effectively main-
tained the status quo, the Court’s decision on the issue before it favored greater 
protection. 
 13. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
 14. Id. at 835. 
 15. Id. at 832. 
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because sometimes district courts construe patent claims in fa-
vor of patentees and other times in favor of alleged infringers.16 
Decisions that neither strengthened nor weakened intellectual 
property rights were classified as neutral. 
Three analysts applied this methodology to independently 
code each Supreme Court intellectual property decision. There 
was full coder agreement on approximately 90% of the cases. 
Where there was not agreement, the coders met for discussion 
and were able to reach a unanimous agreement in each case. 
Overall, the data appears to indicate a Supreme Court that 
is hostile to intellectual property rights. Of the thirty-four deci-
sions that impacted the substantive strength of intellectual 
property rights, nearly two-thirds (twenty-two decisions) weak-
ened intellectual property protection.17 There is only a 6% like-
lihood of such a disparity arising by chance, assuming equal odds 
of the Court deciding each case either way.18 Whether the Su-
preme Court is selecting cases to weaken rights via the certiorari 
process ex ante or reaching decisions that weaken protection ex 
post, the result on intellectual property law is the same. 
This rough quantitative picture tells only part of the story. 
The many cases that weaken protection might affect intellectual 
property rights in minor ways, while the few cases that 
strengthen rights could have a far greater substantive effect. 
Consequently, the cases need to be analyzed qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively. In addition, these global statistics conceal sig-
nificant variation in how the Supreme Court treated different 
types of intellectual property protection during the period under 
study. Therefore, the following sections divide and analyze the 
 
 16. In a similar vein, Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Uni-
versity v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. concerned whether an employee of a 
university receiving government funding could assign the rights in an invention 
to a third party without the university’s consent. 563 U.S. 776, 776–79 (2011). 
Whether the employee or the university prevailed, the substance and scope of 
the owner ’s patent rights would be the same; the case was simply a debate 
among competing owners. Id. at 783. 
 17. The remaining ten cases were determined to be neutral with respect to 
affecting the strength of protection. 
 18. This statistic is the likelihood of the Supreme Court reaching decisions 
that weaken intellectual property rights in at least twenty-two out of thirty-four 
cases, assuming a 50% likelihood of each decision weakening rights. The for-
mula for this calculation is (m + n)!/(m! x n!) x .5m x .5n, where m is the number 
of decisions weakening rights and n is the number of decisions strengthening 
rights. See WOLFRAMALPHA, https://www.wolframalpha.com (last visited Nov. 
5, 2017) (providing the mathematical formula for such analysis). 
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Supreme Court’s decisions by intellectual property subject mat-
ter.19 
1. The Patent Cases 
The Supreme Court’s twenty-first-century patent jurispru-
dence has been remarkable, both for the quantity of cases that 
the Court decided and for the highly consistent nature of those 
decisions. Over the fifty years from 1952 (when the Patent Act 
was substantially revised) through 2002 (the start of the present 
study), the Supreme Court heard an average of less than one pa-
tent law case per year.20 In the past decade, the Court has heard 
nearly thirty patent cases,21 almost triple the rate of the previ-
ous half-century. For a Supreme Court that hears fewer than 
ninety cases per year,22 averaging three patent cases annually is 
a significant caseload in a single, highly particularized area of 
the law. 
Not only has the Supreme Court recently heard a large num-
ber of patent cases, but the Court has predominantly reached 
holdings that weaken patent owners’ rights. Twenty-three of the 
Supreme Court’s twenty-nine patent cases during this time sub-
stantively affected patentee rights in a measurable direction.23 
 
 19. There is no section on trade secret law as the Supreme Court did not 
decide any trade secret cases during this period. The Supreme Court decided 
one case that tangentially involved trade secret rights, but did not implicate 
trade secret law. See generally Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (concern-
ing the preclusive effects of a federal-court judgment in a case that arose out of 
a challenge to the Federal Aviation Administration’s denial of a Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA) request based on FOIA’s trade secret exemption). 
 20. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme 
Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275, 294 (2002) (explaining 
that during the mid-twentieth century the Supreme Court “seemed to lose in-
terest in” patent cases, and that “[f ]or the next three decades, the Court aver-
aged barely one patent decision per year”); Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the 
Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 387, 387–88 (2001) (refer-
ring to the Supreme Court as having rendered itself “nigh invisible” in patent 
law from 1982 to 2001, having decided only three substantive patent cases dur-
ing this period); Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, https:// 
writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited Nov. 5, 
2017) (listing cases, not all of which are “patent” cases under the pertinent def-
inition here, such as those in which no patent issues were decided). 
 21. The Court decided twenty-eight patent cases from the October 2006 
through October 2015 Terms. See infra App. A. 
 22. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 95 (12th ed. 2016); see also The 
Justices’ Caseload, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www 
.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). 
 23. The remaining patent cases were procedural decisions that did not 
strengthen or weaken patent rights, disputes concerning patent ownership as 
 812 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:803 
 
Of these twenty-three cases, eighteen (78%) weakened patent 
protection. These cases were not focused on obscure or minor at-
tributes of patent law, but often went to the heart of patentabil-
ity and patent protection. As one measure of impact, the five 
most cited Supreme Court patent cases of the time period all 
weakened owner rights.24 
Several of the Supreme Court’s most heavily cited patent 
decisions concerned patent-eligible subject matter. Patent-eligi-
ble subject matter doctrine limits the types of innovation that 
may qualify for protection under the Patent Act. In a series of 
four cases over four years, the Court narrowed the scope of pa-
tent-eligible subject matter. These cases held that patent appli-
cations on methods of hedging losses,25 methods for exchanging 
 
among competing entities without effect on the strength of the rights, or deci-
sions that modified patent standards in a way that appears indeterminate as to 
whether it strengthens or weakens patent protection. See, e.g., Highmark, Inc. 
v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1746 (2014) (holding that 
trial court decisions to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party 
are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 
251, 251–52 (2013) (holding that state courts may have subject matter jurisdic-
tion over a claim of legal malpractice arising from the handling of a patent case); 
Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 
563 U.S. 776, 777 (2011) (holding that a university employee receiving govern-
ment funding may be able to assign the patent rights without the university’s 
consent, in spite of the Bayh-Dole Act); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB 
S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 768 (2011) (permitting “willful blindness” to satisfy the 
knowledge requirement of induced infringement, but rejecting negligence in 
general); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 394–95 
(2006) (holding that a party’s failure to move for a new trial or judgment as a 
matter of law after an unfavorable jury verdict prevents the party from seeking 
a new trial on appeal on the basis of insufficient evidence). 
 24. This analysis is based on Westlaw’s citation tool, which includes cita-
tions in cases, court documents, administrative filings, and secondary sources, 
all as of December 31, 2016. The five most cited patent cases, with citation sta-
tistics rounded to the nearest hundred, are: KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (57,300 citations); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388 (2006) (12,300 citations); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 
U.S. 118 (2007) (8700 citations); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (7000 
citations); and Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 
566 U.S. 66 (2012) (5400 citations). Total citation counts can obscure promi-
nence because cases decided longer ago may have more citations due to longev-
ity rather than importance. To control for time since decision, we also examined 
citation counts based on citations within three years of a given decision. This 
top-five list is not substantially different, and all cases weaken patent protec-
tion: KSR, 550 U.S. 398 (31,100 citations); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Interna-
tional, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (5900 citations); Mayo, 566 U.S. 66 (4800 cita-
tions); MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118 (3600 citations); and eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (3600 
citations). 
 25. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593, 611–12 (holding that a patent application on 
methods of hedging losses is an abstract idea and not patent eligible). 
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financial obligations,26 processes for determining how much of a 
drug to administer,27 and isolated and purified DNA sequences28 
were all ineligible subject matter. Each of these patent applica-
tions was rejected under Supreme Court doctrine prohibiting the 
patenting of “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.”29 Though this doctrine has been around for decades, the 
Supreme Court substantially reinvigorated and strengthened its 
application in these cases.30 Prior to these decisions, the Court 
had not denied subject-matter eligibility in over thirty years.31 
As a result of this series of cases, the Court has reduced the pa-
tent eligibility of a variety of software and biotechnology product 
and process innovations.32 
 
 26. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (holding that a patent application on methods 
for exchanging financial obligations is ineligible subject matter because the con-
cept of intermediated settlement is an abstract idea). 
 27. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 67–69 (holding that a process for determining how 
much of a drug to administer is ineligible subject matter because the claims are 
ineligible laws of nature). 
 28. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
2109 (2013) (holding that isolated and purified DNA sequences are ineligible 
subject matter because they are a naturally occurring product of nature, but 
that synthetically created cDNA is patent eligible). 
 29. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 30. John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for 
Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1765, 1767–69 (2014); Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: 
A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1796, 1808 (2014). 
 31. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 584 (1978) (holding that a “method 
for updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion processes” is not subject 
matter eligible). 
 32. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. 
v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) gave “renewed vigor” to arguments 
against the patent eligibility of computer-implemented process inventions); Ul-
tramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 772 F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reversing 
an earlier subject matter decision to hold computer-implemented advertising 
inventions ineligible in light of Alice); Tamsen Valoir, Who Will Finance Drug 
Development if Natural Products Are No Longer Patentable?, 28 INTELL. PROP. 
& TECH. L.J. 3, 4–7 (2016) (stating concern that Myriad and Mayo will make it 
harder to obtain drug patents in the United States); Daniel K. Yarbrough, Note, 
After Myriad: Reconsidering the Incentives for Innovation in the Biotech Indus-
try, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 141, 141–55 (2014) (discussing how 
Mayo, Myriad, and Alice make it harder to get patents in the biotechnology in-
dustry). 
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The Supreme Court made it more difficult to acquire and 
enforce patents in other ways as well. In two of the most signifi-
cant patent decisions during the period of study,33 the Court 
raised the creativity threshold for acquiring a patent and weak-
ened remedies for patent infringement. The central requirement 
for obtaining a patent is that an invention be nonobvious.34 A 
patent applicant must demonstrate that the invention would not 
have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at 
the time the patent application was filed.35 In KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., the Court made it harder to establish nonobvious-
ness by expanding the scope of subject matter that is considered 
obvious in light of existing technology.36 Subsequent to KSR, 
both the courts and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have 
been more likely to deny patent protection for an invention by 
holding that it is obvious.37 
Similarly, in the context of patent enforcement, eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C. reversed a century of common patent 
practice in holding that injunctions should not routinely issue 
 
 33. These are the two most cited patent decisions of the time period. See 
cases cited supra note 24; see also Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and 
the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 813, 823 (noting that the “KSR 
decision has been hailed as the ‘most significant patent case in at least a quarter 
century’” (quoting John F. Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent 
Substance and Procedure in the Judiciary, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRES-
SIONS 34, 34 (2007), http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol106/iss1/24)). 
 34. NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 
2:101 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvi-
ous: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions 
Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1393 (2006). 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 36. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 37. Gregory N. Mandel, A Nonobvious Comparison: Nonobviousness Deci-
sions at the PTAB and in the Federal Courts, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 403, 
428–29 (2016) (collecting studies that demonstrate this differential); Ali Mojibi, 
An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit’s Pa-
tent Validity Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 581 (2010) (reporting 
empirical analysis of nonobviousness decisions which demonstrates that “both 
the Federal Circuit and District court cases reveal that the courts are more 
likely to find patents invalid for obviousness as a result of KSR ”); Jason 
Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical 
Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 732 (2013) (reporting results of an empirical 
study finding that “[s]ince KSR, patentees and applicants have been less suc-
cessful on the issue of obviousness”); see also Janice M. Mueller, Chemicals, 
Combinations, and “Common Sense”: How the Supreme Court’s KSR Decision Is 
Changing Federal Circuit Obviousness Determinations in Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology Cases, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 281, 308 (2008) (“After KSR, it is un-
questionably easier to establish a prima facie case of obviousness in the chemi-
cal arts.”). 
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based on a finding of patent infringement.38 Rather, federal 
courts are now directed to weigh the more general four-factor 
test to determine whether an injunction should apply.39 Prior to 
eBay, prevailing patentees obtained injunctions in nearly every 
case in which they proved infringement.40 Subsequent to eBay, 
approximately 27% of infringement verdicts have resulted in 
damages rewards without an injunction, thereby weakening pa-
tent protection.41 
The Supreme Court did support stronger patent rights in 
five cases over the pertinent period. Four of these cases, how-
ever, concerned narrow issues of relatively minor consequence. 
In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., the Court held that the patent ex-
haustion doctrine did not permit a farmer to copy patented soy-
bean seeds through reproductive planting and harvesting.42 This 
result had appeared straightforward to most patent practition-
ers and experts.43 Second, Kappos v. Hyatt concerned the extent 
of a patent applicant’s ability to introduce new evidence, beyond 
that submitted to the PTO, in district court proceedings chal-
lenging the PTO’s denial of a patent application.44 The Court 
held that patentees were not limited in this regard.45 Patent ap-
plicants, however, rarely challenge PTO denials in district 
court.46 Third, in Commil USA, L.L.C. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the 
 
 38. 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and 
Why: An Analysis of the Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 
677, 682 (2015). 
 41. Id. (stating that “injunction grants have gone from pre-eBay rates of 
94%–100% to post-eBay rates of 73% for all patent owners and 16% for patent-
ees that do not practice the patents they own.”); Christopher B. Seaman, Per-
manent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1982–83 (2016) (reporting that from 2006–2013 injunctions 
were granted 72.5% of the time). 
 42. 569 U.S. 278, 281–88 (2013). 
 43. Li Guo, Self-Replicating Technologies: Do They Exhaust Patent Rights?, 
18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 197, 222–23 (2013); Robert M. Masters et al., Intellectual 
Property Outlook: Cases and Trends to Follow in 2013, MONDAQ, http://www 
.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/221790/Trademark/Intellectual+Property+ 
Outlook+Cases+And+Trends+To+Follow+In+2013 (last updated Feb. 14, 2013); 
see also Gregory N. Mandel, The Future of Biotechnology Litigation and Adju-
dication, 23 PACE ENVT’L. L. REV. 83 (2006) (discussing patent infringement 
with respect to genetically modified seed). 
 44. 566 U.S. 431, 433–34 (2012). 
 45. Id. at 438–39. 
 46. Mandel, supra note 37, at 420 n.91. 
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Court concluded that an infringer’s subjective belief that a pa-
tent is invalid is not a defense to an allegation of induced in-
fringement,47 an issue that arises relatively infrequently. Last, 
Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. held that en-
hanced damages for willful infringement are available for “egre-
gious” activity “beyond typical infringement,” a result that har-
monized this standard with Supreme Court decisions concerning 
the award of attorney’s fees in patent litigation.48 
The most significant case in which the Supreme Court sup-
ported stronger patent rights is Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Part-
nership,49 which concerned the statutory presumption of validity 
of an issued patent.50 Long-standing precedent held that in order 
to overcome this presumption of validity, a party challenging a 
patent must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.51 
Microsoft Corp. involved an accused infringer’s argument that, 
at least in certain circumstances, establishing invalidity should 
only require a preponderance of the evidence.52 The Supreme 
Court upheld the clear and convincing evidence standard.53 
 
 47. 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928–30 (2015). 
 48. 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016). None of the preceding four cases has been 
cited more than 650 times (either in total or within three years of decision), in 
each case less than one-fifth as often as the heavily cited patent cases discussed 
earlier. See cases cited supra note 24. The latter two were decided relatively 
recently, so their citation counts may change. Commil USA, L.L.C. v. Cisco Sys., 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015), in particular, represents an area the Court has paid 
significant attention to recently. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s 
Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 
1008, 1025 (2016). 
 49. 564 U.S. 91 (2011). Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership is the ninth 
most-cited patent decision of the period (4200 citations), and eighth most cited 
within three years of decision (2700 citations). 
 50. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at 100. 
 51. Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at 97–98. 
 52. Id. at 99. 
 53. Id. at 95. That said, experimental evidence suggests that the standard 
of proof does not significantly influence the outcome of cases. Dorothy K. Kage-
hiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 
9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 163–73 (1985) (discussing an empirical study finding 
that different standards of proof produced similar jury verdicts); Mandel, supra 
note 34, at 1437–38 (discussing the presumption of validity and standard of 
proof in patent law). But see Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number 
Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 
1148 (1987) (arguing that each common standard of proof has a distinct psycho-
logical meaning). 
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On balance, the modern Supreme Court has repeatedly 
demonstrated a penchant for weakening patent protection.54 
This trend in patent decisions presents a significant departure 
from the Supreme Court’s prior patent jurisprudence. A study of 
Supreme Court intellectual property cases from 1954 to 2006 
found that the Court was more likely to reach holdings in favor 
of the intellectual property owner in patent cases.55 As the Su-
preme Court did not decide any patent cases from 2002 to 2005,56 
the combined results indicate that the Supreme Court favored 
stronger patent rights for the half-century prior to the present 
study, but has been weakening patent protection subsequently. 
This shift appears to have been relatively abrupt; the Supreme 
Court held in favor of strengthening patent protection in all but 
one of the substantive patent law cases decided in the five years 
preceding the 2002 Term.57 
Prior commentators have focused on patent-specific expla-
nations for the Supreme Court’s recent patent jurisprudence, 
 
 54. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 45–
46 (2010) (discussing how recent Supreme Court decisions have “clearly oper-
ated to narrow substantive patent rights”); Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimila-
tion of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1422 (2016) (stating that recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence has “reined in patent rights”); Robert J. Rando, 
America’s Need for Strong, Stable and Sound Intellectual Property Protection 
and Policies: Why It Really Matters, FED. LAW., June 2016, at 12–13 (explaining 
that the Supreme Court’s activity in patent cases is viewed by some “as a coun-
ter-balance to the perceived Federal Circuit’s pro-patent . . . decisions”). 
 55. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 841. As discussed below, this study found the 
same results for copyright and trademark cases as well. Id. 
 56. See infra App. A. 
 57. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 724–25 (2002) (holding that prosecution-history estoppel creates a rebut-
table presumption against infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, not 
an absolute bar); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 
124, 145 (2001) (holding that plant breeds are utility patent-eligible subject 
matter); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28–30 
(1997) (affirming the existence of doctrine of equivalents infringement of patent 
rights). Contra Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (holding 
that the on-sale period that can bar a patent can be triggered before an inven-
tion is reduced to practice). In addition, the Court decided a number of patent 
cases with a “neutral” effect during this period. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado 
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002) (holding that the Federal 
Circuit lacks jurisdiction in cases in which patent law is only raised in a coun-
terclaim); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (holding that state sovereign immunity rights supersede 
patent infringement claims); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (hold-
ing that the Administrative Procedure Act’s “substantial evidence” standard ap-
plies to federal court review of PTO fact-finding). 
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such as the Court reacting against the Federal Circuit expand-
ing patent protection58 or responding to concerns about patent 
trolls.59 Though these rationales may explain some of the case 
outcomes, several aspects of the dataset indicate that there are 
broader influences that have not been previously identified. A 
first piece of evidence from the data is that the Supreme Court’s 
recent tendency towards weakening protection has manifested 
itself in trademark law as well, subject matter that does not im-
plicate patent troll concerns and which (in these cases) did not 
arise out of the Federal Circuit.60 
2. The Trademark Cases 
Although the Supreme Court has heard only six trademark 
cases over the past fourteen years, the arc of these decisions is 
similar to the patent cases.61 Of the four Supreme Court deci-
sions that affected substantive trademark rights, three of them 
 
 58. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescrip-
tion for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 671 
(2009); Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent 
Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 72–77 (2013); Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 
supra note 54, at 44. 
 59. See J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1104 
(2014); Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 MINN. L. REV. 421, 446 
(2016); Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 54, at 44. “Patent 
trolls” is a pejorative term used to refer to a very hard-to-define class of arguably 
problematic patent litigation by nonpracticing entities. 
 60. The Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction over trademark infringe-
ment cases, but does hear appeals from trademark registration disputes at the 
PTO. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). None of the Supreme Court’s trademark cases 
since 2002 have arisen from the Federal Circuit. See infra App. A. 
 61. Three other decisions sometimes included in lists of Supreme Court 
trademark cases are excluded from the analysis here because, as discussed 
above, the Supreme Court decided these cases on the basis of false advertising 
and antitrust issues. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (holding that a party has standing to maintain a 
false advertising claim under the Lanham Act for a commercial injury proxi-
mately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentation); POM Wonderful L.L.C. v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2234 (2014) (holding that competitors may bring 
Lanham Act claims alleging unfair competition from false or misleading product 
descriptions on food and beverage labels regulated by the Federal Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)); Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 
183, 201 (2010) (holding that licensing activities for individual teams’ intellec-
tual property, conducted through a corporation separate from the teams, consti-
tuted concerted action that was not categorically beyond the coverage of section 
1 of the Sherman Act). 
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weakened protection, and these include the decisions that have 
been the most precedentially significant.62 
The two most prominent trademark cases decided during 
this time period were likely Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.63 
and Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.64 In Mose-
ley, Victoria’s Secret sought to enjoin the Moseleys from using 
the name “Victor’s Little Secret” for a store selling lingerie and 
adult novelty items.65 Victoria’s Secret argued that the Moseley’s 
use of “Victor’s Little Secret” would dilute Victoria’s Secret’s 
brand.66 The district court and circuit court held that the two 
names were sufficiently similar such that Victor’s Little Secret 
would dilute Victoria’s Secret brand through tarnishment.67 The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that dilution requires proof of 
“actual dilution,” not simply the possibility or probability of di-
lution.68 This result weakened protection by making dilution 
more difficult to prove for trademark owners.69 
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the 
Court prevented Fox from asserting trademark rights in a tele-
vision series whose copyright protection had lapsed.70 Fox owned 
 
 62. The most cited trademark cases of the time period according to 
Westlaw’s citation tool, as of December 31, 2016, are Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), and Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), both in total citations (4400 citations and 2500 cita-
tions, respectively) and in citations within three years of decision (1100 citations 
and 1000 citations, respectively). See also Tom W. Bell, Misunderestimating 
Dastar: How the Supreme Court Unwittingly Revolutionized Copyright Preemp-
tion, 65 MD. L. REV. 206, 226 (2006) (discussing the import of Dastar); Krista F. 
Holt & Scot A. Duvall, Chasing Moseley’s Ghost: Dilution Surveys Under the 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1311, 1311 (2008) (stat-
ing that Moseley was a landmark decision); Greg Lastowka, Trademark’s Dae-
mons, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 811 (2011) (noting that Moseley is one of the most 
prominent examples of trademark dilution law). Two of the Supreme Court 
trademark decisions concerned procedural issues that did not strengthen or 
weaken substantive trademark protection. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis In-
dus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1305 (2015) (holding that trademark issues adjudi-
cated by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board preclude a party from arguing 
the same issues before a district court); Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. 
Ct. 907, 911 (2015) (holding that whether two trademarks can be tacked for 
priority purposes is a question of fact for the jury). 
 63. 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 64. 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 65. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 418. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 425. 
 68. Id. at 433. 
 69. Id. at 434. This holding would be quickly reversed by Congress. See in-
fra Part I.B.1. 
 70. 539 U.S. 23, 23–24 (2003). 
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the copyright to Dwight D. Eisenhower’s book Crusade in Europe 
and to a derivative television series of the same name.71 The cop-
yright on the book was renewed, but the copyright on the televi-
sion series was not and lapsed in 1977.72 Dastar purchased cop-
ies of the television series, edited them, repackaged them, and 
sold them under the title World War II Campaigns in Europe. 
Unable to state a copyright claim against Dastar’s work because 
the television series had entered the public domain, Fox argued 
that Dastar’s work violated Fox’s trademark rights because 
Dastar was passing off the work of others as its own.73 The Su-
preme Court unanimously held that once a work enters the pub-
lic domain anyone can use it, with or without attribution to the 
author, and that trademark law cannot be used to make an end 
run around lapsed copyright protection.74 
The Court also weakened trademark owner rights in KP Per-
manent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., holding that 
asserting a fair-use defense in trademark infringement litigation 
did not place the burden of negating any likelihood of confusion 
on the defendant.75 The sole trademark case of the period of 
study in which the Supreme Court strengthened owner rights 
was Already, L.L.C. v. Nike, Inc., in which the Court held that a 
trademark owner’s covenant not to sue a defendant deprived the 
Court of Article III jurisdiction over the defendant’s action to in-
validate the trademark.76 
Though the decisions are relatively few in number, the mod-
ern Supreme Court has demonstrated a proclivity for weakening 
trademark protection. As with patent law, this trend is contrary 
to how the Supreme Court had decided trademark cases for the 
half-century prior to the present study.77 
3. The Copyright Cases 
In contrast to the patent and trademark decisions, the Su-
preme Court has been highly receptive to copyright owners’ 
claims over the past fourteen years. The Court has decided nine 
copyright cases in this time, strengthening protection in six of 
them and reaching neutral conclusions in two others. All four of 
 
 71. Id. at 25–26. 
 72. Id. at 26. 
 73. Id. at 27. 
 74. Id. at 37–38. 
 75. 543 U.S. 111, 124 (2004). 
 76. 568 U.S. 85, 85–86 (2013). 
 77. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 841. 
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the Court’s most cited copyright decisions reinforced protec-
tion.78 This penchant for strengthening copyright protection is 
consistent with the Court’s prior copyright jurisprudence.79 
The landmark copyright decision of the period is likely El-
dred v. Ashcroft, which upheld the Copyright Term Extension 
Act against challenges based on both the Intellectual Property 
Clause and the First Amendment of the Constitution.80 The chal-
lengers claimed that the Act’s extension of already existing cop-
yright terms exceeded Congress’s power under the Intellectual 
Property Clause, which authorizes copyrights “for limited 
Times” in order to “promote the Progress” of “Science and the 
useful Arts.”81 The Court held that such an extension was within 
Congress’s authority.82 In concert with Eldred, the Supreme 
Court held in Golan v. Holder that Congress did not violate the 
Intellectual Property Clause by restoring copyright protection to 
certain foreign works that were previously in the public do-
main.83 
The Supreme Court issued a number of other decisions dur-
ing this period that supported stronger copyright owner rights. 
For example, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd. concerned the potential liability of peer-to-peer Internet 
file-sharing companies for copyright infringing activity by their 
users.84 The plaintiffs were a consortium of twenty-eight large 
entertainment companies. The Court held that an entity that 
distributes “a device with the object of promoting its use to in-
fringe copyright . . . is liable for the resulting acts of infringe-
ment by third parties.”85 The decision was a substantial victory 
for the entertainment companies, and led to the shutdown of the 
Grokster website.86 
 
 78. The most cited copyright cases, with both total and three-year citation 
data as of December 31, 2016, are: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grok-
ster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (6200 citations total; 1700 at three years); Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (3500 citations total; 1000 at three years); Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (3200 citations total; 1900 at 
three years); and Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014) 
(1100 citations total; 1100 at three years). 
 79. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 841. 
 80. 537 U.S. 186, 187–90 (2003). 
 81. Id. at 193. 
 82. Id. at 222. 
 83. 565 U.S. 302, 307–08 (2012). 
 84. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 85. Id. at 914. 
 86. Galen Hancock, Note, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd.: Inducing Infringement and Secondary Copyright Liability, 21 BERKELEY 
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The sole copyright decision in the past fourteen years that 
limited copyright owners’ protection was Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc.87 Kirtsaeng involved copyright law’s first sale doc-
trine, which permits a party to sell a legally acquired copy of a 
copyrighted work without violating the copyright owner’s exclu-
sive right to distribute the work.88 This doctrine allows a person 
who buys a physical copy of a book or work of art to resell it with-
out infringing the copyright owner’s right to distribute.89 The 
Court held that the first sale doctrine applies to works that had 
been lawfully made or acquired abroad, effectively permitting 
the importation of copyrighted works that are legally acquired 
outside the United States.90 
In summary, the Supreme Court’s recent intellectual prop-
erty jurisprudence has been doctrinally divided. This difference 
indicates that the Supreme Court does not appear to view intel-
lectual property as a unitary field.91 The Court has heavily fa-
vored intellectual property owners in its copyright cases, while 
significantly weakening intellectual property protection in pa-
tent and trademark decisions. Each of these trends has been con-
sistent over the time period in question, even as there has been 
turnover among five of the nine Supreme Court Justices.92 Be-
fore attempting to explain these trends, the following sections 
consider congressional activity during this same period. 
 
TECH. L.J. 189, 189 (2006); GROKSTER, http://www.grokster.com (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2017). 
 87. 568 U.S. 519 (2013). 
 88. Id. at 1354–55. 
 89. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Equity’s Unstated 
Domain: The Role of Equity in Shaping Copyright Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 
1879 (2015). 
 90. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 523. 
 91. Cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1441, 1442–43 (2010) (suggesting that “patent and copyright law have 
more in common” than usually recognized); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Prop-
erty as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 
1799–1814 (2007) (comparing patent and copyright law from a variety of per-
spectives). 
 92. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. was appointed to the vacancy left by 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in 2005; Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. was 
appointed to the vacancy left by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in 2006; Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor was appointed to the vacancy left by David H. Souter in 2009; 
Justice Elena Kagan was appointed to the vacancy left by Justice John Paul 
Stevens in 2010; and Justice Scalia died in February 2016 and was replaced by 
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch in 2017. Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2017). 
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B. CONGRESS 
A reality of modern politics is that the United States Con-
gress rarely passes legislation.93 When Congress does take ac-
tion in intellectual property law, such legislation since the be-
ginning of the twenty-first century has overwhelmingly tended 
to strengthen intellectual property owners’ rights. 
Congress enacted thirty-four statutes that modified intellec-
tual property laws in the past fourteen years. Several of these 
statutes impacted multiple areas of intellectual property law 
(most commonly affecting both patent law and trademark law in 
relation to the PTO). Such multi-domain statutes were coded as 
multiple entries in the database, yielding a total of forty-three 
intellectual property legislative actions. 
Utilizing the same methodology described above,94 three 
coders classified each legislative action as strengthening intel-
lectual property rights, weakening intellectual property rights, 
or being neutral with respect to such rights. Initial agreement 
exceeded 90%, and all discrepancies were resolved by discussion 
and research concerning the legislation in question.95 Though 
 
 93. Mark A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on 
Identifying and Mending a Dysfunctional Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 
642–43 (2014); Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Prob-
lem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2218 (2013); Amanda 
Terkel, 112th Congress Set to Become Most Unproductive Since 1940s, HUFF-
INGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/28/ 
congress-unproductive_n_2371387.html. See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
Dysfunctional Congress?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 371, 371, 373 (2009) (discussing sev-
eral aspects of congressional dysfunction). 
 94. Supra Part I.A. 
 95. The coders disagreed about how to categorize two of the substantive 
legislative acts. The first was the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, which per-
mits Internet radio stations and streaming services to negotiate rates directly 
with record companies. Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974. One coder initially 
concluded that this law weakened the rights of sound recording copyright own-
ers because they were no longer bound by the rates established by Copyright 
Royalty Judges and could instead negotiate with SoundExchange (statutorily 
authorized to represent all sound recording copyright owners). Two coders iden-
tified the law as neutral because it simply placed Internet radio stations and 
streaming services in the same position as small webcasters had been under the 
Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780. 
After further research, this law was classified as neutral based on the reasoning 
above and because the National Association of Broadcasters, the body repre-
senting the sound-recording copyright owners, had negotiated the Small 
Webcaster Settlement Act and did not object to the Webcaster Settlement Act 
of 2008. Peter DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to 
Copyright Policy, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 235–36 (2012); see also NAB State-
ment on Senate Passage of Webcaster Settlement Act, NAT’L ASS’N. OF BROAD-
CASTERS (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.nab.org/documents/newsroom/pressRelease 
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certain of the statutes included multiple provisions, each was 
considered as a unitary whole for analysis because each statute 
is passed as a single legislative act.96 
At first glance, forty-three legislative acts may sound like a 
surprisingly high level of activity, but many of these acts were 
administrative or procedural in nature, with a neutral effect on 
intellectual property rights. Examples include laws concerning 
internal organization at the PTO and the Copyright Office,97 
statutes that transferred authority to appoint administrative pa-
tent and trademark judges,98 and laws that extended sunset pro-
visions.99 Removing these laws from the dataset leaves twenty 
 
.asp?id=1672. The second law that coders initially differed on was the Trade-
mark Dilution Revision Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Two coders classified this as strengthen-
ing trademark protection because the legislation was passed specifically to 
overturn the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 
537 U.S. 418 (2003), to clarify that a trademark owner need only establish a 
likelihood of dilution to support a dilution claim. The third coder believed the 
statute was indeterminate because, in addition to the strengthening effects al-
ready noted, the law also clarifies that trademark dilution only applies to na-
tionally recognized famous marks, not famous marks recognized in a niche mar-
ket. After further research, the law was classified as strengthening protection 
based on Congress’s clear intent in passing the act to strengthen dilution pro-
tection in light of Moseley. Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in 
Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427, 486–87 (2010); Jessica Silbey, The Mythical 
Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 377–78 (2008). 
 96. Under this approach the legislative acts, just like the Supreme Court 
decisions, are individually of differing import. Though this approach precludes 
certain types of statistical analysis, it maintains fidelity to actual legislative 
practice and permits the holistic analysis provided here. 
 97. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 14, 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-274, 126 Stat. 2456 (mak-
ing administrative and funding revisions to PTO funding requirements to make 
all patent fees available for expenses relating to patent processing and to permit 
patent and trademark fees to be used interchangeably to cover proportionate 
shares of the PTO’s administrative costs); United States Capitol Police Admin-
istrative Technical Corrections Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-145, 124 Stat. 49 
(authorizing the Director of the PTO to reorganize funds in certain ways and 
subject to certain conditions); Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341 (replacing the copyright royalty 
arbitration process with three permanent Copyright Royalty Judges appointed 
by the Librarian of Congress); An Act to improve the United States Code, Pub. 
L. No. 108-178, 117 Stat. 2637 (2003) (codifying certain PTO powers and duties). 
 98. Act of Aug. 12, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-313, 122 Stat. 3014 (transferring 
authority to appoint administrative patent and trademark judges from the Di-
rector of the PTO to the Secretary of Commerce). 
 99. See, e.g., STELA Reauthorization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-200, 128 
Stat. 2059 (reauthorizing the satellite carrier distant broadcast signal license 
passed in 2010 for five additional years); Satellite Television Extension and Lo-
calism Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-175, 124 Stat. 1218 (reauthorizing the sat-
ellite carrier distant broadcast signal license passed in 2004 for five additional 
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congressional acts of legislation over the past fourteen years that 
substantively impacted intellectual property owners’ rights. 
Seventeen of these twenty substantive changes to statutory 
intellectual property law made intellectual property rights eas-
ier to acquire, broader, or stronger. The only two laws that weak-
ened intellectual property rights were of very minor significance. 
The final statute was likely the most significant piece of intellec-
tual property legislation during the period, the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act,100 a statute which made a variety of 
changes that both strengthened and weakened protection. The 
odds of obtaining such lopsided legislative results by chance, as-
suming equal likelihood of strengthening or weakening protec-
tion, are less than 1%.101 
Congressional intellectual property action in the first part 
of the twenty-first century has dominantly strengthened intel-
lectual property protection. Unlike contemporary Supreme 
Court decisions, Congress’s legislation has been relatively con-
sistent across the intellectual property domains. Nevertheless, 
analyzing the statutes by field provides a more nuanced under-
standing of congressional action, as the following sections detail. 
1. Trademark Legislation 
Trademark law provides an easy context in which to begin 
because all seven of the substantive pieces of trademark legisla-
tion during this period strengthened owner rights. The most sig-
nificant trademark law enacted since 2002 was the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act of 2006.102 This statute overrode the afore-
mentioned Supreme Court decision in Moseley v. V Secret Cata-
logue, Inc.103 Recall that in Moseley, the Supreme Court weak-
ened protection by holding that trademark owners must prove 
 
years); Temporary Extension Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-144, 124 Stat. 42 (ex-
tending through March 28, 2010, the moratorium on copyright liability for cer-
tain subscribers of satellite TV by amending the Communications Act of 1934); 
Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-447, 118 Stat. 3393 (extending copyright provisions to allow television com-
panies to provide distant network signals to subscribers who cannot receive 
broadcast network television signals via over-the-air television antennas). 
 100. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 101. See WOLFRAMALPHA, supra note 18. 
 102. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 
Stat. 1730. 
 103. Trademark Dilution Revision Act § 2; Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); see discussion supra Part I.A.2.  
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actual dilution rather than only a likelihood of dilution.104 The 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act provides that likelihood of di-
lution is the standard for an owner of a famous mark to establish 
dilution,105 making it easier for the owners of famous marks to 
support a cause of action for dilution.106 
Another significant trademark statute was the Prioritizing 
Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 
2008.107 This law prohibited the transshipment or exportation of 
counterfeit goods and services as violations of trademark law.108 
The law also amended trademark seizure provisions to broaden 
protective order requirements and increased the damages avail-
able for the use of counterfeit trademarks.109 All of these provi-
sions strengthened trademark owners’ rights. The Trade Facili-
tation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 similarly 
strengthened trademark rights and enforcement in the context 
of the import and export of infringing goods.110 
The four other trademark laws passed in this period were of 
more modest import. The Trademark Technical and Conforming 
Amendment Act of 2010 lets trademark owners cure certain reg-
istration deficiencies.111 The Intellectual Property Protection 
and Courts Amendments Act of 2004 made it easier for trade-
mark owners to prove willful infringement in relation to domain 
names.112 The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropria-
tions Authorization Act implemented the Madrid Protocol, which 
enables trademark owners who register with the national office 
of one country to have trademarks registered in all participating 
 
 104. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. 
 105. Trademark Dilution Revision Act § 2. 
 106. As discussed above, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act also clarified 
the meaning of a famous mark, providing that a mark must be recognizable by 
a member of the general public to be considered famous. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 107. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256. 
 108. Id. § 205. 
 109. Id. §§ 102, 104. 
 110. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-
125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016). 
 111. Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-146, 124 Stat. 66. 
 112. Intellectual Property Protection and Courts Amendments Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-482, §§ 202–03, 118 Stat. 3912, 3916–17. 
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countries.113 And lastly, the Collectible Coin Protection Act en-
hanced trademark owners’ rights in connection with unauthor-
ized, trademark-infringing collectibles.114 All seven trademark 
statutes that affected substantive rights in the last fourteen 
years strengthened trademark protection. 
2. Copyright Legislation 
Twenty-first-century copyright legislation also has been rel-
atively uniform. Congress passed eight substantive copyright 
statutes during this time, and six of these strengthened protec-
tion. For example, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforce-
ment Act of 2015 strengthened copyright protection and enforce-
ment in relation to the import and export of copyright infringing 
works.115 The Family Entertainment and Copyright Act in-
creased copyright infringement penalties to target the unauthor-
ized early release of movies or software and the filming of movies 
by audience members in movie theaters.116 The Prioritizing Re-
sources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 
expanded copyright owners’ rights in several manners, such as 
providing a safe harbor for copyright registrations that contain 
inaccurate information, allowing courts to impound various rec-
ords while an infringement action is pending, and deeming un-
authorized export (not just import) of phonorecord copies to be 
copyright infringement.117 Other legislation strengthened copy-
right protection for vessel design,118 phonorecords,119 and fraud-
ulent online activity.120 
The two copyright statutes that weakened protection did so 
in a narrow context: clarifying that particular educational uses 
of copyrighted material are exempt from copyright infringement 
 
 113. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 13401–03, 116 Stat. 1758, 1913, 1920 (2002). 
 114. Collectible Coin Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 113-288, 128 Stat. 3281 
(2014). 
 115. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-
125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016). 
 116. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 
119 Stat. 218. 
 117. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, §§ 101–02, 105, 122 Stat. 4256, 4257–59. 
 118. Vessel Hull Design Protection Amendments of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
434, 122 Stat. 4972. 
 119. Copyright Cleanup, Clarification, and Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-295, § 5, 124 Stat. 3180, 1381. 
 120. Fraudulent Online Identity Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 108-482, §§ 201–
05, 118 Stat. 3912, 3916–18.  
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liability. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improve-
ment Act of 2004 (IDEA) establishes that copyright protection 
does not bar a publisher of instructional materials used in ele-
mentary or secondary schools from creating and distributing cer-
tain instructional materials specified by IDEA, as long as they 
are used within limitations established under IDEA.121 Simi-
larly, the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations 
Authorization Act extended a copyright liability exemption for 
instructional broadcasting for the purpose of digital distance 
learning and distance education.122 
Overall, Congress has expanded copyright protection across 
several domains substantially more than it has limited protec-
tion in particularized educational contexts. 
3. Trade Secret Legislation 
Historically, trade secret law was primarily state law, but 
Congress recently enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act, which 
created a private federal cause of action for trade secret misap-
propriation for the first time.123 In addition to implementing 
standard trade secret protection in federal law, the Act included 
a new provision allowing trade secret owners to seek an order ex 
parte to seize allegedly stolen trade secret information from a 
defendant’s possession “in extraordinary circumstances” to pre-
vent further dissemination.124 
Prior to the Defend Trade Secrets Act, the Economic Espio-
nage Act of 1996 provided certain federal trade secret protec-
tions, but limited enforcement authority to the Attorney Gen-
eral.125 Congress twice previously amended the Economic 
Espionage Act during the time period under consideration. The 
Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012 expanded the 
Economic Espionage Act to prohibit the theft of trade secrets 
taken for intended (not just actual) use and broaden the defini-
tion of a trade secret under federal law to include information 
related to services (not just information related to products).126 
 
 121. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647, 2807–08. 
 122. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13301, 116 Stat. 1758, 1910–13 (2002). 
 123. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(b)(1), 130 
Stat. 376, 376 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2012)). 
 124. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 125. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839. 
 126. Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, 
126 Stat. 1627.  
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The Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act 
of 2012 increased the fines available as penalties for economic 
espionage.127 All three congressional acts concerning trade se-
cret law passed during the period of study strengthened trade 
secret protection. 
4. Patent Legislation 
Congress has passed just three statutes in the last fourteen 
years that substantively impact patentee rights. Two of these 
strengthened patent protection. The third, the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (AIA), is the most complex and substantial 
intellectual property statute passed since the turn of the cen-
tury. 
The AIA cannot be simply characterized as either strength-
ening or weakening patent protection because the statute re-
vised the Patent Act in several manners that do not directly in-
teract with each other. Most famously, the AIA shifts the United 
States from a first-to-invent patent system (under which the law 
generally awarded a patent to the first person to invent an in-
vention) to a first-to-file patent system (under which the law gen-
erally awards a patent to the first inventor to file a patent appli-
cation).128 These changes in priority generally do not strengthen 
or weaken patent protection; they simply determine who among 
competing inventors is entitled to a patent.129 Some commenta-
tors perceive this shift as favoring sophisticated, industrial in-
ventors over individual, less well-funded inventors in a race to 
the patent office.130 
 
 127. Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-269, §2(a), 126 Stat. 2442, 2442.  
 128. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 
284, 285 (2011); David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? 
The America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 519–
20 (2013); Jason Rantanen, Lee Petherbridge, & Jay P. Kesan, Debate, America 
Invents, More or Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 229, 230–31 (2012), http:// 
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review_online/vol160/iss1/3. 
 129. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3; Abrams & Wagner, supra note 
128; Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules 
Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1313 (2003); Rantanen et al., supra 
note 128, at 230. 
 130. Andrew L. Sharp, Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable Consti-
tutionality of First-to-File, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2013); see also 
Abrams & Wagner, supra note 128, at 559 (reporting the results of a study 
which indicated “a significant decline in patenting by individual inventors rela-
tive to larger entities that is caused by the change in Canadian patent law from 
a first-to-invent to first-to-file priority rule”). 
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The AIA made several other changes to the Patent Act, some 
of which weakened protection. The AIA revised the system for 
asking the PTO to reconsider the issuance of a patent in internal 
administrative proceedings.131 These changes generally weaken 
patent rights because they create a less-expensive venue in 
which third parties can challenge issued patents.132 The AIA also 
essentially eliminated patents on methods of reducing or avoid-
ing tax liability and provided certain prior user rights for entities 
that had been using an invention for more than a year before 
another inventor filed for a patent.133 Each of these changes lim-
its ownership rights. 
Conversely, the AIA strengthened patent protection in cer-
tain regards. To obtain a patent an inventor must disclose not 
only how to make and use the subject invention, but also the best 
mode for practicing the invention.134 The AIA retains the best 
mode requirement in form, but eliminates failure to disclose best 
mode as an invalidity defense in infringement litigation, a 
change that is decidedly pro-patentee.135 The AIA made addi-
tional changes that benefited patent owners, such as proscribing 
the ability of private parties to bring false marking lawsuits and 
broadening a limitation on the ability of prior work by a research 
team to render later innovation by the team obvious due to per-
sonnel changes.136 
Overall, the AIA contains many provisions that weaken pa-
tent rights and others that strengthen protection. The legislative 
history of the act sheds light on the complex, mixed bag nature 
of the law. The AIA had a tortuous and heavily negotiated legis-
lative history.137 The first version of the bill that eventually be-
came the AIA was introduced in the House of Representatives in 
 
 131. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6. 
 132. Robert L. Stoll, Maintaining Post-Grant Review Estoppel in the America 
Invents Act Revisited: A Call for Legislative Restraint, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 15, 16 
(2013) (explaining that Congress intended post-grant review to be a “quick and 
cost effective alternative to litigation” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 
48 (2011))); Jeff Kettle, Congress Giveth and Taketh Away: A Look at Section 18 
of the America Invents Act and the Review of Business Method Patents, 94 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 201, 203 (2012) (explaining that post-grant re-
view was meant to provide a quicker and cheaper avenue to litigation). 
 133. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 14; 
35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 134. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 135. Id. §§ 112(a), 282(b)(3)(a). 
 136. Id. §§ 102(c), 292. 
 137. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents 
Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435 (2012) [hereinafter Matal, Part I]; see also 
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2005.138 A similar bill was introduced in the Senate in 2006.139 
Though committee hearings were held, neither piece of legisla-
tion advanced.140 In 2007, parallel bills were introduced in the 
Senate and House that would have significantly weakened pa-
tent protection. These bills had strong support in Congress and 
from many powerful industry players in the information technol-
ogy and computer fields.141 The bills were also highly controver-
sial and encountered significant pushback, generally led by the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors.142 The alignment of 
powerful industries on opposite sides of the patent reform debate 
led to a several-year dance in which new bills were introduced in 
Congress every year, each successively watered down in an effort 
to find common ground.143 
Because a number of the AIA’s provisions have a clear sub-
stantive impact on patent law, it would be inappropriate to clas-
sify the AIA as neutral with respect to patent rights. But it is 
also hard to say that it definitively either strengthens or weak-
ens patent rights overall. Its net impact will only be seen over 
time and will depend significantly on how courts interpret its 
provisions. 
The two other substantive patent laws enacted since 2002 
are easier to classify. The Cooperative Research and Technology 
Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004 amended federal patent 
law so that a shift in research team membership would not allow 
 
DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 100–02 (2009). See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative 
History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539 (2012) 
[hereinafter Matal, Part II] (detailing the legislative history of AIA provisions 
that only apply after a patent has been issued). 
 138. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (1st sess. 2005); Matal, Part I, supra note 137, 
at 438. 
 139. S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2d sess. 2006); Matal, Part I, supra note 137, at 
439. 
 140. See Matal, Part I, supra note 137, at 438–39. 
 141. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137, at 101–02; Jonas Anderson, Congress 
as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 961, 
982–84 (2014); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Re-
form, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 469–71 (2010). 
 142. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137, at 101–02; Christopher M. Holman, 
Biotechnology’s Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 318, 318, 325 (2006); Stephen B. Maebius, 2007 Patent Reform Bill: 
Will It Benefit Nanotechnology?, 4 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 171, 173–74 
(2007). 
 143. Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Re-
form, 61 ALA. L. REV. 501, 526–27 (2010); see Matal, Part I, supra note 137, at 
439–47.  
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an earlier team’s work to render a later team’s work obvious.144 
The goal of the CREATE Act was to promote cooperative re-
search by protecting patent rights for group innovation.145 The 
second law is the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003, which included several modest 
changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.146 These revisions require com-
panies seeking to produce a generic version of a patented phar-
maceutical to submit more detailed information and to notify the 
brand-name patent owner sooner.147 
Two of the three patent laws passed during the period in 
question thus strengthened patent rights, and the third made a 
number of changes with mixed effects on patent protection. 
Across intellectual property law, the twenty substantive laws en-
acted by Congress over the past fourteen years overwhelmingly 
tended to strengthen intellectual property protection. This trend 
was true both generally and in each of the intellectual property 
domains. 
The quantitative and qualitative data analysis provided 
here depicts two extremes of Congress–Supreme Court interac-
tion: copyright law, in which the branches are in accord, and pa-
tent and trademark law, in which the branches appear deeply 
divided. The division in patent and trademark law cannot be dis-
missed as the Court simply interpreting federal statutes because 
a significant number of the decisions that weaken protection in-
volve changes to judge-made law rather than statutory interpre-
tation.148 In addition, if the Court were simply interpreting stat-
utes in accordance with Congress’s intended meaning, we would 
expect a roughly even split between strengthening and weaken-
ing decisions. There is no reason to expect that any lack of clarity 
 
 144. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-453, § 2, 118 Stat. 3596, 3596. 
 145. See id. 
 146. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. 
 147. Id. § 1112. The Act also contains a provision that allows generic version 
applicants to make a counterclaim in patent infringement lawsuits to require 
patent owners to remove certain inappropriately listed patents from the Orange 
Book, a list of patents associated with approved drug products. Id. § 1101. Based 
on research, this provision was deemed to be less significant than the patent-
strengthening provisions. Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of 
the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharma-
ceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 233–49 (2005). 
 148. The four patent eligible subject matter cases provide clear examples, as 
do several of the other cases discussed in the text above. See generally App. A. 
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in statutory terms should be biased in one direction, and cer-
tainly no reason such a bias would appear in patent and trade-
mark legislation, but not in copyright law. 
While Congress spent the first part of the twenty-first cen-
tury almost exclusively strengthening intellectual property pro-
tection, the Supreme Court has been pushing nearly as strongly 
in the opposite direction for patent and trademark protection. 
The disagreement between these branches of government that 
explicitly bubbled to the fore in one trademark case appears to 
underscore a far deeper divide.149 Understanding the reasons for 
this interbranch divide is the subject of the next part. 
II.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFLUENCES   
The stark divergence between the Supreme Court’s and 
Congress’s perspectives on intellectual property law raises im-
portant questions concerning why these branches of government 
appear to view the law through such strikingly different lenses, 
and which branch might have the better view of the law. Part II 
of this Article seeks to answer the former question, turning to 
various models of institutional influence to generate hypotheses 
about why the two branches may be behaving in different man-
ners. Part III of the Article tackles the latter, normative ques-
tion, discussing insights that can be drawn concerning which 
branch is more likely to produce socially desirable intellectual 
property law and what the institutional fracture means for gov-
ernmental function more broadly. 
A. CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCES 
The comparison of intellectual property lawmaking in the 
Supreme Court and Congress provides a useful case study on ju-
dicial and legislative activity because the divergence presents 
clear evidence that the different branches of government are in-
fluenced by different mechanisms. The mechanisms that influ-
ence Congress and the Supreme Court have been studied by po-
litical scientists, legal scholars, and other experts, but it is rarely 
possible to draw strong conclusions because most examples con-
cern only one branch and there are always varied causal fac-
tors.150 Governmental decision-making is difficult to parse, and 
 
 149. See supra Parts I.A.2, I.B.1 (discussing Congress’s enactment of the 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act to override the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003)). 
 150. See, e.g., Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 805, 828 (2010); Benjamin G. Bishin, Constituency Influence in 
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this Article does not claim to have a definitive answer, but the 
existence of different outcomes provides the possibility of being 
able to draw causal hypotheses.151 Section II.A analyzes appar-
ent influences on Congress’s intellectual property decision-mak-
ing, followed by Section II.B analyzing such influences on the 
Supreme Court.152 
1. Public Choice 
Analyzing legislative influences on intellectual property law 
can pick up precisely where the discussion of the data in Part I 
left off—with the AIA. As the analysis above described, industry 
interests played a significant role in shaping the AIA.153 Certain 
large companies and industry organizations were the primary 
drivers who initiated the AIA bills in an effort to weaken patent 
protection; conversely, contrary industry entities pushed back 
against early versions of the bills in an effort to maintain the 
status quo or strengthen patent rights where possible.154 At first 
 
Congress: Does Subconstituency Matter?, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 389, 404–06 (2000); 
Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Deci-
sionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1534–35 (2009); Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad West-
erland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Judicial Review, 83 N.C. L. REV. 
1323, 1351–52 (2005). 
 151. Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 
83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 199 (2004); see David C. Donald, Law in Regression? Im-
pacts of Quantitative Research on Law and Regulation, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 520, 527 (2015).  
 152. Both Congress and the Court, of course, are made up of individual mem-
bers. Any analysis, such as those herein, examining influences on these bodies 
necessarily does so in a holistic manner. Just as we speak of the Constitution’s 
Framers’ intent in a broad sense, recognizing that it can be formally decon-
structed, it is useful to consider what actions and influences appear to be affect-
ing other governmental bodies as a whole, even while realizing that the manner 
of influence is complex and actually takes place on an individual level. See, e.g., 
Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme 
Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1491–92 (2001) (reporting study 
results that indicate that “Justices are individual human beings whose partic-
ular behavior is not reducible to simple models”); Barry Friedman, The Politics 
of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 270–329 (2005) (discussing a variety of 
political, individual, and institutional influences on judicial decision-making); 
Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 555, 558–59, 
577 (2010) (discussing the interaction between individual legislator motivations 
and institutional decision-making in Congress). See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITU-
TION (1997) (discussing the difficulty of determining original intent with respect 
to the Constitution). 
 153. See discussion supra Part I.B.4. 
 154. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137; Nguyen, supra note 141. See generally 
Vertinsky, supra note 143, at 526 (describing industry efforts to influence intel-
lectual property legislation). 
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glance it might appear surprising that even though the center-
piece of the AIA—shifting the United States to a first-to-file pa-
tent system—was largely uncontroversial, it still took over six 
years to pass the legislation.155 In reality, these provisions were 
less controversial because this change was viewed by institu-
tional parties on both sides of the debate as benefiting estab-
lished companies.156 The wealthy industry leaders who were of-
ten in bitter opposition with respect to strengthening or 
weakening various patent provisions were unified on a legal 
change that was mutually beneficial to established companies at 
the potential cost to individual inventors and smaller companies. 
The lack of controversy among the major entities concerning 
first-to-file highlights that passage of the AIA was guided signif-
icantly by established, connected industry interests. This history 
is consistent with standard models of public choice theory.157 
In their seminal work on legislative decision-making and 
public choice, Professors Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey char-
acterize legislative conduct as influenced by constituent interest, 
legislator ideology, and special interest groups.158 The relative 
weights of these three factors depend on the context and nature 
of particular legislation.159 Under an idealized view of Congress’s 
role in the federal government, ideology and constituent interest 
are valid and appropriate bases for legislative action, while spe-
cial interest group influences are not necessarily so. Farber and 
Frickey reason from this proposition to argue that courts analyz-
ing legislative action should therefore respect legislative policy 
decisions, but also attempt “to mitigate undue interest group in-
fluence.”160 
Many authors have built upon this work, trying to identify 
and evaluate the contexts in which special interest groups hold 
the greatest sway.161 Special interest groups appear to be the 
most powerful when trying to influence legislation that benefits 
a small, concentrated group, but whose costs or other negative 
 
 155. Matal, Part I, supra note 137, at 435–36. 
 156. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 130. 
 157. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS 
AND COMMENTARY 3–62 (1997) (collecting a variety of literature concerning 
public choice and special interest group influence). 
 158. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public 
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 900–01 (1987). 
 159. Id. at 901. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See generally STEARNS, supra note 157 (collecting a variety of literature 
concerning public choice and special interest group influence). 
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effects are widely distributed.162 Special interest groups also ap-
pear better able to block detrimental legislation from being en-
acted than they are at getting beneficial laws passed.163 
This conceptual understanding of public choice theory and 
special interest group influence on legislation dovetails quite 
strikingly with intellectual property law. Under Farber and 
Frickey’s tripartite model of legislator influence, two of the three 
prongs would be expected to have relatively minor influence in 
most intellectual property contexts. Studies indicate that people 
tend not to have strongly-held opinions about intellectual prop-
erty law and that intellectual property law is not high on most 
people’s radar.164 For these reasons, general constituent pres-
sures and legislator ideology would be expected to produce only 
minor influences on legislator preferences concerning intellec-
tual property laws. The legislative history of the AIA appears to 
bear this out. While special interest groups were heavily in-
vested in the debates, there was little public interest.165 The AIA 
represents the most significant piece of intellectual property leg-
islation enacted this century. Most other intellectual property 
legislation received little to no public attention. The lack of 
strongly held ideological positions about intellectual property 
law on the part of most legislators, and limited constituent at-
tention, leaves special interest groups to play an outsized role in 
intellectual property legislation. 
 
 162. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Prop-
erty Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2236 (2000); see Vertinsky, supra 
note 143, at 527–28; see also Frank B. Cross, Essay, The Judiciary and Public 
Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355, 372 (1999) (“Indeed, there is reason to believe 
that special interests are at their most influential when it comes to blocking 
beneficial government action (rather than creating undesirable government ac-
tion).”); Farber & Frickey, supra note 158, at 906 (stating that interest groups 
“often exercise more power when they block legislation than when they support 
it”). 
 163. Vertinsky, supra note 143, at 527–28; Cross, supra note 162; see Einer 
R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 64 (1991); Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: 
Public Choice and Limits on Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 280, 284–85 
(1990). 
 164. Gregory N. Mandel et al., Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fal-
lacy, 2015 BYU L. REV. 915, 951–56 (2015); see also OFFICE FOR HARMONIZA-
TION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET, THE EUROPEAN CITIZENS AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: PERCEPTIONS, AWARENESS AND BEHAVIOUR (2013). Intellectual 
property attorney opinions differ from lay public opinion. Gregory N. Mandel, 
What Is IP for? Experiments in Lay and Expert Perceptions, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 659 (2016). 
 165. See generally Matal, Part II, supra note 137 (detailing the history of the 
AIA). 
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Exacerbating this dynamic, many intellectual property laws 
concern rights benefiting relatively few, concentrated groups (in-
tellectual property owners) at the expense of diffuse, uncoordi-
nated individuals (intellectual property users). Accordingly, the 
political and economic structure of intellectual property law 
makes it an area ripe for special interest influence.166 Even on 
matters of limited popular attention and diffuse public interest, 
however, Congress is still meant to have the public’s interest in 
mind. Low public awareness and knowledge does not mean that 
Congress can abdicate its role as the representative of the peo-
ple; rather, it may be precisely in such circumstances where this 
responsibility is greatest.167 
Several authors have specifically identified special interest 
rent-seeking as the driving force behind particular intellectual 
property legislation, from the movie and music industries to var-
ious technological fields.168 As a result, content and creation in-
dustries have often lobbied successfully to expand intellectual 
property protection in the copyright, trademark, and patent law 
contexts.169 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 
which extended the term of copyright protection prospectively 
and retrospectively, has been specifically identified as “a classic 
instance of almost pure rent-seeking legislation” resulting from 
the asymmetry in lobbying power between special interest intel-
lectual property owners and the diffuse public interest.170 The 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act171 and the Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act172 also have been identified as specific 
 
 166. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 14 (2004); Merges, supra note 162; Viva R. 
Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping 
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1496–97 (2004). 
 167. See generally Andrew W. Neidhardt, The Federalist View of Right-to-
Work Laws, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 251, 264–65 (2015) (discussing the 
role representative groups play in advocating for citizens’ interests in the con-
text of complex legislation); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountabil-
ity, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1266–71 (2009) (discussing political accountability 
in the context of issues where the public is largely uninformed). 
 168. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the 
Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112 (2004); Merges, supra note 162; Moffat, 
supra note 166, at 1497. See generally Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compro-
mise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860–61 (1987) (discuss-
ing the influence of interest groups on the legislative process). 
 169. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 166; Merges, supra note 162. 
 170. Merges, supra note 162, at 2236–37; see also Moffat, supra note 166, at 
1497. 
 171. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). 
 172. Id. § 1125(d). 
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instances of trademark owner industry lobbying efforts.173 Sim-
ilarly, but in a very different context, the establishment of the 
Federal Circuit in 1982 was considered by some to be the result 
of successful special interest group efforts.174 
Professors Jay Kesan and Andres Gallo studied the legisla-
tive efforts of different industry groups during the AIA legisla-
tive process and concluded that industry lobbyists “have a strong 
influence on the voting behavior of congresspersons, and they 
have a real influence on the direction of patent reform.”175 Based 
on analysis of congressional voting records on an earlier version 
of the AIA, the authors found that voting correlated with contri-
butions from various patent law interests and concluded, “Con-
gress does not have a point of view independent from the stake-
holders in the patent system. Rather, [voting] . . . reflect[s] the 
participation and preferences of major stakeholders, such as the 
information technology industry, the pharmaceutical industry, 
the law associations, and the manufacturing sector.”176 
These examples appear to confirm the public choice model 
and explain why twenty-first-century intellectual property legis-
lation has tended to accommodate owner interests and 
strengthen intellectual property rights. That substantive intel-
lectual property legislation was successfully enacted twenty 
times in fourteen years is particularly notable, given that Con-
gress passes few laws and that special interest groups are iden-
tified as being at their strongest in blocking undesirable legisla-
tion.177 In intellectual property law, special interests have been 
powerful enough to not only prevent what they view as problem-
atic laws, but to proactively get stronger laws passed. 
Intellectual property interests have consistently achieved 
this success even as the dominant political parties have shifted 
over time. During the first part of the period under study, Re-
 
 173. MALLA POLLACK, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO TRADEMARK LAW 
§ 10:2 (2017) (referring to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 as largely 
being considered a result of lobbying efforts by the International Trademark 
Association); Suzanna Sherry, Irresponsibility Breeds Contempt, 6 GREEN BAG 
2D 47, 53 (2002) (discussing lobbying efforts of trademark owners leading to the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act). 
 174. Moffat, supra note 166, at 1498; Landes & Posner, supra note 168. 
 175. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent 
System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1385 (2009). 
 176. Id. at 1413. 
 177. See Vertinsky, supra note 143 (discussing role of special interest groups 
in patent legislation). 
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publican George W. Bush was President and Republicans con-
trolled a majority of seats in the House of Representatives and 
in the Senate.178 In a later two-year block during the period, 
Democrat Barack Obama was President and Democrats con-
trolled both chambers of Congress.179 At other times, control of 
the Legislative and Executive Branches was split among the par-
ties in various ways.180 In each of these time periods, Congress 
enacted legislation strengthening intellectual property rights. 
This fact both demonstrates the strength of special interests in 
pursuing intellectual property legislation and underscores the 
point that intellectual property tends not to have a strong ideo-
logical bearing. 
2. Intellectual Property Subfields 
Several authors have noted the almost uniform success of 
copyright- and trademark-industry lobbying efforts, in contrast 
to a more mixed record for patent-industry interests.181 One ex-
planation for this difference is that copyright- and trademark-
industry actors tend to be more uniform in preferring stronger 
intellectual property protection, so there usually is no powerful 
industry player to push back.182 
Patent industry interests, on the other hand, are often more 
diffuse when it comes to their patent law preferences, which may 
partially explain why less patent legislation was passed during 
the period of study than copyright and trademark legislation. 
While most copyright- and trademark-industry entities benefit 
from stronger intellectual property protection in relation to their 
consumers, patent practice functions differently.183 Many pa-
tent-industry entities both produce intellectual property them-
selves and also consume other owners’ intellectual property in 
 
 178. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, HISTORY, ART & AR-
CHIVES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/ 
Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions (last visited Nov. 5, 2017); Party Division in the 
Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv 
.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). 
 179. HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra 
note 178; U.S. SENATE, supra note 178. 
 180. HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES U.S.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra 
note 178; U.S. SENATE, supra note 178. 
 181. Litman, supra note 168, at 871; Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A 
Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 448 (2002). 
 182. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 175, at 1413; Litman, supra note 168, at 
872–74; Liu, supra note 181. 
 183. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 175, at 1370. 
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order to bring products to market.184 As a result, patent-industry 
entities are more likely to end up on the opposite sides of intel-
lectual property debates, depending on the particular industry 
context and whether a specific firm or industry innovates itself 
or utilizes the innovation of others.185 This is what took place 
with the debates over the AIA discussed above.186 
All of that being said, the copyright and trademark tide in 
Congress may be turning. The Stop Online Piracy Act187 (SOPA) 
and PROTECT IP Act188 (PIPA) were the House and Senate ver-
sions, respectively, of bills designed to thwart the widespread 
availability of movies, music, and other media on the Internet in 
violation of copyright law.189 These bills were supported by ma-
jor media lobbies, including the Motion Picture Association of 
America and the Recording Industry Association of America, as 
well as by the United States Chamber of Commerce.190 SOPA 
and PIPA would have penalized or prohibited Internet search 
engines and web payment sites from providing access or pay-
ment to websites that distribute material in violation of federal 
copyright laws.191 
Initially, SOPA and PIPA had widespread, bipartisan con-
gressional support.192 In December 2011, however, a collection of 
technology and Internet companies, including Google, Facebook, 
Amazon, and Wikipedia, came out in strong opposition based on 
 
 184. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property As Process: How Innovation Markets Se-
lect Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 390 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Ten 
Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not to), 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 149, 151 (2007); Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy Signals: Capturing Private In-
formation for Public Benefit, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 36 (2012). 
 185. Barnett, supra note 184, at 388; Kesan & Gallo, supra note 175, at 
1351–53; Mandel, supra note 184, at 24. 
 186. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 187. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 188. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of 
Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 189. Michael A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An Alphabet Soup of In-
novation-Stifling Copyright Legislation and Agreements, 11 NW. J. TECH. & IN-
TELL. PROP. 21, 21–23 (2013); Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Pub-
lic Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
203, 220–21 (2013); Sepehr Shahshahani, The Nirvana Fallacy in Fair Use Re-
form, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 273, 314 (2015). 
 190. Lev-Aretz, supra note 189, at 244. 
 191. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. §§ 102(c)(1), (c)(2)(A)(i), (c)(2)(B)–(C)(i), (c)(4)(A) 
(1st Sess. 2011); S. 968, 112th Cong. §§ 3(d)(1), (d)(2)(C)–(D), (e)(1) (1st Sess. 
2011). 
 192. Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Anti-
piracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, at B6; Edward Wyatt, Lines Drawn on 
Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at B1. 
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concerns about Internet censorship and stifling online innova-
tion.193 Congressional leaders were taken aback by the 
groundswell of public opposition to SOPA and PIPA, and indefi-
nitely postponed action on the legislation.194 Though the re-
sponse against SOPA and PIPA was coordinated by certain con-
centrated industry interests, it also depended heavily for its 
success on the numerous, diffusely affected members of the pub-
lic that the industry players were able to mobilize. After regu-
larly passing intellectual property legislation in the decade lead-
ing up to the SOPA and PIPA debates, the only intellectual 
property legislation that Congress has passed subsequently 
which strengthened owners’ rights was in the trade secret con-
text. 
Empirical evidence, historical analysis, and public choice 
theory converge on a relatively convincing argument that 
twenty-first-century intellectual property legislation has been 
significantly driven by special interest groups.195 This story ap-
pears to track legislative efforts in copyright, trademark, trade 
secret, and patent law, in each case leading to legislation with 
consistently stronger protection for intellectual property rights. 
As noted above, the unidirectional nature of legislative change 
in intellectual property law may now be shifting. The AIA de-
bates uncovered widely disparate positions on patent protection 
across different industries, and the failure of SOPA and PIPA 
speaks to the rise of other industry players who are pressing 
against certain copyright expansions. Even with this transfor-
mation, congressional legislative activity on intellectual prop-
erty still appears largely driven by special interest efforts; these 
interests, however, may be less uniform in their preferences than 
they were previously. 
B. SUPREME COURT INFLUENCES 
The substantial difference in the course of intellectual prop-
erty activity between the Supreme Court and Congress over the 
past fourteen years strongly indicates that different factors are 
influencing the different branches’ decision-making.196 This is 
 
 193. Wyatt, supra note 192, at B6; Jenna Wortham, A Political Coming of 
Age for the Tech Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2012, at A1. 
 194. Weisman, supra note 192. 
 195. This is not to deny that such influences also operated prior to this pe-
riod, as much of the evidence indicates. 
 196. It is also true that Congress and the Supreme Court have different abil-
ities to set their own agendas. Congress can pass legislation on any matter that 
passes constitutional muster, while the Supreme Court is limited to deciding 
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not surprising. Congress is made up of a large number of popu-
larly elected representatives who serve for limited terms, have a 
strong desire to get reelected, and can come from any back-
ground.197 The Supreme Court consists of nine Justices ap-
pointed for life, and though there is no constitutional require-
ment as such, all Supreme Court Justices have been trained in 
the law, and there has not been a Supreme Court justice who did 
not graduate from law school in over seventy years.198 Even more 
narrowly, nearly every Justice who served during the time pe-
riod in question was appointed from a federal circuit court of ap-
peals.199 
Studies of Supreme Court decision-making tend to divide 
the basis for decisions into three broad categories of influence: 
legal reasoning, justice ideology, and popular opinion.200 These 
categories are generalizations and certainly not the only way to 
conceptualize Supreme Court decisions, but they provide a use-
ful framework for discussion. These influences are not mutually 
exclusive, and can operate to varying degrees on different issues 
and with different Justices.201 Exploring these influences in re-
lation to intellectual property decisions yields several insights. 
 
cases or controversies that are presented to it. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. 
III, § 2. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Given the number 
of appeals seeking certiorari to the Supreme Court and the Court’s ability to 
choose which cases it will grant certiorari in, however, the Court does have sub-
stantial agenda-setting authority. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 399; Ed-
ward A. Hartnettal, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five 
Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1718 (2000) (“[T]he power 
to decide what to decide . . . enables the Court to set its own agenda.”). 
 197. Kareem Crayton, Legislative Politics and the Politics of Legislatures, 14 
ELECTION L.J. 241, 244 (2015); Alan L. Feld, Congress and the Legislative Web 
of Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 349, 350 (2001); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint 
Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control Over Immigration Policy, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1787, 1804–05 (2010). 
 198. Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx (Oct. 27, 2015). 
 199. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). Justice Kagan is the only justice 
who served during the period of study that was not previously an appellate 
judge. Id. 
 200. Christopher J. Casillas et al., How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 74, 86 (2011); Epstein & Martin, supra note 
12, at 396, 404; Sag et al., supra note 5, at 802; Unah et al., supra note 12, at 
299. 
 201. Cross & Nelson, supra note 152, at 1491–92; Epstein & Martin, supra 
note 12, at 405. Certainly, for example, litigation is not free from special interest 
group influence and advantage. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Have” 
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1. Legal Reasoning 
Though deductive legal reasoning based on legal rules may 
be a traditional and common lay perception of Supreme Court 
decision-making, it is implausible to attribute all intellectual 
property decisions to such analysis.202 Many Supreme Court in-
tellectual property cases raise novel issues and cannot be framed 
as being decided based solely, or even primarily, on reasoning 
from binding legal authority.203 For example, as discussed above, 
four of the most high-profile patent cases during the period of 
study concerned patent-eligible subject matter.204 Doctrinally, 
each of these decisions turned on whether a particular invention 
fell within a judicially created exception to patent eligibility for 
“abstract ideas, physical phenomena, and laws of nature.”205 One 
would be hard-pressed to find a concrete legal basis for this rule, 
let alone the particular contours of the rule, in the Patent Act.206 
Instead, this doctrine was created by the Court, and some of it 
was elaborated for the first time in these cases.207 The original 
judicial interpretation that guides the subject matter decisions 
cannot be attributed to deductive reasoning from prior legal 
 
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 95 (1974). 
 202. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common 
Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1552 (2010); Sag et al., supra 
note 5, at 810–11. 
 203. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behav-
ior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 789, 823 (2009) (making this 
point about novelty with respect to cases in general). 
 204. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Mo-
lecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collab-
orative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 205. Supra Part I.A.1 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980)). 
 206. Some attribute the basis of the subject-matter-exception doctrine to the 
simple use of the word “invention” in section 101 of the Patent Act. Dan L. Burk, 
The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 505, 514, 524 (2014); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the 
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism 
and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1292–93 (2011). Whether or not this single word can sup-
port such doctrine in general, it provides little basis for defining the scope of the 
exclusion. 
 207. Miriam Bitton, Patenting Abstractions, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 153, 162–
63 (2014); Menell, supra note 206, at 1292. 
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rules.208 Many other Supreme Court intellectual property deci-
sions are similar in this regard. 
The difference between congressional and Supreme Court 
decision-making in patent and trademark law likewise belies an 
argument that intellectual property decisions are simply the re-
sult of deductive legal reasoning. The Intellectual Property 
Clause of the Constitution provides Congress the power “[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”209 Facially, this clause pro-
vides relatively few restrictions on Congress’s authority to legis-
late with respect to intellectual property law. For example, in 
several high-profile cases discussed above, litigants argued that 
the “promote the Progress” language must at least proscribe 
Congress from passing intellectual property laws that grant ret-
roactive rights and take subject matter out of the public do-
main.210 The Supreme Court disagreed, and has consistently re-
fused to read any significant limitations into Congress’s 
intellectual property authority.211 Consequently, Congress has 
extremely broad leeway to legislate in the context of intellectual 
property law. Given this lack of constitutional constraint, it 
seems improbable that the Supreme Court would reach starkly 
divergent outcomes from Congress as the result of the Court’s 
legal interpretation of Congress’s legislation. That is, it is doubt-
ful that Congress persistently intends the Court to narrowly in-
terpret Congress’s attempts to broaden patent and trademark 
rights, and even more implausible that Congress would intend 
 
 208. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354–56; Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2116–
18; Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1297–98; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 
603–04, 608–09; see John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 1247, 1261 (2011) (“Most of the rules for finding patentable subject matter 
have been judicially created.”); see also Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 
75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 592 (2008) (“Current patentable subject matter jurispru-
dence is based not on actual issues the Court historically decided, but instead 
on sweeping dicta that outlined unsubstantiated concerns about broad patent 
claims.”). 
 209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 210. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 211. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limita-
tions, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1332, 1403, 1405 (2012); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellec-
tual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 317–18 
(2004); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promo-
tion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1771, 1829 (2006). 
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the Court to follow such an approach in patent and trademark 
cases, but the opposite approach in copyright cases. 
2. Justice Ideology 
Experts and scholars who analyze Supreme Court decision-
making have identified a significant role for Justice ideology in 
the Court’s decisions in several fields of law.212 This attitudinal 
model posits that Justices often reach decisions based on their 
ideological beliefs and preferences as opposed to more tradi-
tional, theoretically value-free legal reasoning.213 Numerous 
studies find that the attitudinal model correlates with Supreme 
Court decision-making to a greater extent than other models.214 
The attitudinal model has been developed and demon-
strated primarily in relation to coding cases along a liberal-to-
conservative spectrum.215 The attitudinal paradigm, however, is 
commonly perceived as having “little or no relevance” to Su-
preme Court decision-making in intellectual property cases.216 
Under this view, the traditional liberal-conservative divide that 
tends to define attitudinal decision-making has only limited im-
 
 212. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 191–202, 221–31, 245–71 (1993); see also Tracey E. 
George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision-Making, 86 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325–26 (1992). But see Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” 
or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning 
and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 411–13 (2016) (reporting 
an experiment indicating that judges tend not to be ideologically driven when 
engaging in statutory interpretation). 
 213. Jack M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1153 
(1991);  George & Epstein, supra note 212, at 325–26, 334. 
 214. George & Epstein, supra note 212, at 325; Sag et al., supra note 5, at 
802; Unah et al., supra note 12, at 295 (“The attitudinal model is a well-estab-
lished behavioral theory of U.S. Supreme Court decision-making.”). The attitu-
dinal model is part of common lay perceptions about Supreme Court decision-
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the Justices. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAY 
REV., May 11, 2014, at 1 (discussing ideological polarization on the Court); Da-
vid Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme 
Court, ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/ 
259155 (analyzing ideological polarization on the Court). 
 215. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 805–06; Jeff Yates & Elizabeth Coggins, The 
Intersection of Judicial Attitudes and Litigant Selection Theories: Explaining 
U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 263, 270–75 
(2009). 
 216. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 809. 
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port for intellectual property issues, and therefore does not sig-
nificantly affect such cases.217 Such analysis places intellectual 
property issues in the same category as some other types of eco-
nomic cases that do not appear to be particularly ideologically 
driven.218 
This perspective is consistent with the Supreme Court Jus-
tices’ voting patterns in the intellectual property cases studied 
here. The Court issued unanimous opinions in twenty-three of 
the thirty-four substantive intellectual property decisions dur-
ing the period of study, just over two-thirds of the cases. The 
Court’s rate of unanimous opinions in all other cases during this 
period is around 35%, far lower than in the intellectual property 
decisions.219 Further, not a single one of the Court’s forty-four 
intellectual property cases was decided by a five to four vote, in 
comparison with over 20% of the Court’s opinions in other 
fields.220 In other words, the Court reaches unanimous decisions 
in intellectual property cases nearly twice as often as in non-in-
tellectual property cases, and does not divide along its usual lib-
eral-conservative axis. These data indicate that the Court was 
not substantially driven by political ideology in intellectual prop-
erty cases during the period of study.221 
 
 217. CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 33 (2008) (“Pa-
tent law issues rarely separate neatly along political party lines.”); Ann Bartow, 
When Bias Is Bipartisan: Teaching About the Democratic Process in an Intellec-
tual Property Law Republic, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 715, 715 (2008) (“[I]dentifica-
tion as a Democrat or Republican does not provide too much guidance or create 
too many expectations about a person’s view of intellectual property issues.”); 
Sag et al., supra note 5, at 811 (“[A] more plausible explanation . . . is that judi-
cial policy preferences regarding IP do not fit within the stereotypical view of 
the liberal-conservative ideological continuum.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Nancy Staudt et al., The Ideological Component of Judging in 
the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1799 (2006) (finding no ideology 
effect on Supreme Court Justice decision-making in taxation cases in general, 
though finding an effect in corporate tax cases); E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert 
B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance 
of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1572 (2004) (concluding that 
Supreme Court justice ideology does not appear to affect decision-making in se-
curities and antitrust cases); see also Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme 
Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting 
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1150–51 (2004) 
(finding that legal experts had a particularly difficult time predicting Supreme 
Court outcomes in economic cases). 
 219. Sunstein, supra note 3. 
 220. Id. at 782. 
 221. To be more precise, the data indicates that the Justices are not ideolog-
ically driven from a liberal-versus-conservative perspective. It is possible that 
the Justices are being driven by some other, nonpolitical ideology. Infra Part 
II.B.3. 
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Professors Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi, and Maxim Sytch 
conducted a comprehensive empirical study on the effect of judi-
cial ideology on Supreme Court intellectual property decisions 
from 1954 to 2006. The authors found a minor ideological effect 
indicating that the more conservative a Justice is, the more 
likely the Justice was to vote in favor of an intellectual property 
owner.222 Politically liberal Justices, on the other hand, did not 
show any correlation with deciding cases against intellectual 
property owners.223 The effect of ideology on intellectual prop-
erty cases was significantly lower than the effect of ideology on 
Supreme Court decision-making in other legal fields.224 As in the 
instant study, the authors found that the Justices agreed with 
each other more often in intellectual property cases than in Su-
preme Court cases generally.225 Based on their analysis, the au-
thors concluded that the then-incipient Roberts Court would be 
more supportive of stronger intellectual property rights than the 
prior court.226 This prediction did not prove to be accurate, as the 
case analysis above reveals that the Roberts Court has been hos-
tile to patent and trademark rights nearly across the board, alt-
hough the Court has been receptive to copyright protection. 
Thus, in the Supreme Court’s recent cases, political ideology 
does not appear to be playing even the limited role that it may 
have played earlier. 
Several empirical studies have examined judicial ideology 
and intellectual property decision-making in specific contexts. 
For example, Professor Barton Beebe has studied whether polit-
ical ideology affected judicial decision-making in cases involving 
certain copyright and trademark issues, and found no effect in 
either context.227 Kimberly Moore, now herself a Federal Circuit 
judge, examined whether a judge’s political ideology affected 
their decisions in patent claim construction cases, and likewise 
found no effect.228 These studies did not focus on Supreme Court 
decisions. 
 
 222. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 838–40. 
 223. Id. at 845. 
 224. Id. at 846. 
 225. Id. at 822, 835. 
 226. Id. at 851. 
 227. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trade-
mark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1647–48 (2006); Barton Beebe, Does 
Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes?: Evidence from the Fair 
Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517, 521 (2008). 
 228. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Pa-
tent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38–39 (2001). 
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In sum, the data indicate that Justice ideology appears to 
play little to no role in Supreme Court intellectual property de-
cisions during the time period under study. This is not entirely 
surprising. As discussed earlier, people tend not to have strongly 
held views on intellectual property protection, and the Supreme 
Court Justices who served during this term had limited prior ex-
perience in intellectual property law.229 The Justices all went to 
law school at a time before intellectual property courses were a 
common part of the law school curriculum.230 Specific experience 
in a legal field is hardly a necessary antecedent to having an ide-
ological position about issues on the matter, but there is little 
evidence from their backgrounds to indicate that the Justices 
who have served on the Supreme Court during the period of 
study brought particular ideological views about intellectual 
property law to the Court with them.231 
3. Popular Opinion 
The analysis above indicates that the Supreme Court’s in-
tellectual property decisions cannot generally be explained by 
deductive legal reasoning or Justice ideology. Perhaps popular 
opinion is playing a greater role. At first glance, the notion that 
popular opinion is significantly influencing Supreme Court deci-
sions appears antithetical to paradigmatic notions of American 
governmental roles. Congress, and the President, are tradition-
ally expected to be the branches of government that are most 
responsive to popular will.232 The Supreme Court, on the other 
hand, is designed to act as a countermajoritarian check on Con-
 
 229. See generally Biographies of the Justices, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www 
.scotusblog.com/reference/educational-resources/biographies-of-the-justices 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2017). Justice Breyer ’s authoring a well-known article on 
copyright law in 1970 is a notable exception. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case 
for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Pro-
grams, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). For a discussion of tangential connections 
between the Justices and intellectual property law, see infra note 258. 
 230. The current Supreme Court Justices graduated from law school be-
tween 1959 and 1986. Biographies of the Justices, supra note 229. 
 231. Again, Justice Breyer ’s article on copyright law is an exception, though 
ironically the article is critical of copyright expansionism, whereas copyright 
law is the one area of intellectual property where the Court has tended to 
strengthen rights. See generally Breyer, supra note 229. 
 232. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Pow-
ers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2359 (2006); Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The 
Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 (2006). 
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gress when necessary to protect against the potentially uncon-
stitutional tyranny of the majority.233 
A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that this 
commonly held political perspective may be somewhat reversed 
in practice. Rather than being countermajoritarian, the Su-
preme Court often appears to act in concert with majoritarian 
preferences—or with what the Court believes to be majoritarian 
preferences.234 
The “countermajoritarian difficulty” is a term given to the 
seemingly paradoxical ability of an unelected Supreme Court to 
thwart the will of the representative branches.235 Defending this 
governmental structure as legitimate in a democracy has been 
seen as a significant challenge in constitutional theory.236 Recent 
work indicates that the countermajoritarian difficulty may not 
be as significant a problem in practice as it has been conceived 
historically. Work by a number of legal empiricists, political sci-
entists, and legal historians indicates that the Supreme Court 
often issues opinions consistent with national public opinion 
trends.237 Justice Anthony Kennedy recognized this relation-
ship: “In the long term, the court is not antimajoritarian—it’s 
majoritarian.”238 
 
 233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Countermajoritarian Oppor-
tunity, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 353, 360–69 (2010) (“When other [branches] have 
made decisions infringing on fundamental rights, the court may be called upon 
to play a special role in regulating these officials in a countermajoritarian fash-
ion.”). 
 234. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 277; Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-
Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 116, 158 (2012); Jeff Yates et al., For 
the Times They Are A-Changin’: Explaining Voting Patterns of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices Through Identification of Micro-Publics, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 117, 
122 (2013). 
 235. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SU-
PREME COURT AS THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962); Barry Friedman, The His-
tory of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: The Road to Judicial Supremacy (pt. 
1), 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998); Unah et al., supra note 12, at 298. 
 236. Friedman, supra note 235, at 334–36; Lain, supra note 234, at 114–15; 
David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 
723, 727 (2009). 
 237. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 280; Lain, supra note 234, at 115, 
167; Law, supra note 236, at 729 (“As a historical matter, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions have been, whether by coincidence or design, largely in sync with pub-
lic opinion.”); Unah et al., supra note 12, at 310. 
 238. Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says Avoid a Ken-
nedy, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A1. 
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Professors Lee Epstein and Andrew Martin have conducted 
one of the most comprehensive analyses of the relationship be-
tween Supreme Court decision-making and public opinion.239 
These scholars compared the ideological disposition of every 
orally argued Supreme Court decision from 1958 to 2008 against 
the public mood at the time, based on a commonly used quarterly 
measure of public mood among American adults.240 Controlling 
for numerous factors, including the ideology of the Supreme 
Court median Justice, the direction of the decision on appeal, 
and the ideology of the President, the House, and the Senate, the 
analysis finds a statistically significant correlation between the 
public mood at the time of oral argument and the ideological pro-
pensity of the Supreme Court decision.241 
In a similar vein, Professor Corinna Barrett Lain conducted 
a detailed historical review of three seminal Supreme Court 
cases that are typically identified as exemplifying the counter-
majoritarian difficulty: Brown v. Board of Education,242 Furman 
v. Georgia,243 and Roe v. Wade.244 Based on a variety of contem-
porary accounts, judicial writings, and public opinion data, she 
concludes that in each case the Court reached an outcome that 
the Justices believed was consistent with the direction of public 
opinion.245 A number of other studies are in accord with both Ep-
stein and Martin’s and Lain’s analyses.246 As Chief Justice 
 
 239. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 263–67, 271–74. 
 240. Id. at 272. 
 241. Id. at 277. 
 242. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 243. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 244. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned 
Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 504 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 245. Lain, supra note 234, at 125, 131, 135 (“Brown presents a striking ex-
ample of the Supreme Court responding to, and reflecting, deep shifts in pre-
vailing norms when the democratic process would not . . . . The Justices in Fur-
man’s majority saw their ruling in fundamentally majoritarian terms . . . . 
Rather than a Supreme Court thwarting majority will, Roe shows a Supreme 
Court vindicating it—again responding to, and reflecting, deep shifts in public 
opinion when change through the democratic process was blocked.”). 
 246. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT 
(2008) (finding that the Supreme Court decisions since the 1930s have been con-
sistent with public opinion data over 60% of the time); Casillas et al., supra note 
200, at 79 (finding that “public mood has both a significant short- and long-run 
influence on the Court’s decisions” for a dataset of Supreme Court cases from 
1956 to 2000); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous 
Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public 
Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1033 (2004) (“We have found that the Court’s policy 
outcomes are indeed affected by public opinion, but to a degree far greater than 
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Rehnquist stated, “[Justices] go home at night and read the 
newspapers or watch the evening news on television; they talk 
to their family and friends about current events . . . [and cannot] 
escape being influenced by public opinion.”247 
Though we cannot know for sure, a variety of circumstantial 
evidence supports the conclusion that the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in intellectual property cases may be driven in significant 
part by popular opinion. This is not to assert that public opinion 
is the only mechanism affecting Supreme Court decisions in in-
tellectual property, or that it explains all decisions. But public 
opinion appears to play a notable role, one that has not previ-
ously been recognized. 
It may appear counterintuitive to suggest that public opin-
ion is affecting Supreme Court intellectual property decisions 
when the public has limited knowledge of intellectual property 
law and does not appear to pay significant attention to such is-
sues.248 Low knowledge, however, is not a barrier to strongly 
held opinions,249 and limited attention does not mean that there 
is no influence. Several lines of evidence support the hypothesis 
that the Supreme Court’s intellectual property decisions tend to 
reflect popular sentiment. 
First, popular opinion about intellectual property law is con-
sistent with the tendency of Supreme Court decisions in patent 
and trademark law. Survey data reveals that the popular per-
ception of intellectual property rights is that they are too 
strong.250 These public preferences are found across a variety of 
subject matter, from medicine to literary works and from music 
 
previously documented.”); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judi-
cial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 864–87 (2009) (discussing the Court’s shift 
in death penalty, sex-based classification/equal protection, and substantive due 
process cases as instances of the Court moving towards public opinion); Unah 
et al., supra note 12, at 310 (finding “a strong and robust association between 
public mood and the direction of Supreme Court decisions” for a dataset of Su-
preme Court cases spanning 1952 to 2011). See generally Jane S. Schacter, Com-
mentary, What Marriage Equality Can Tell Us About Popular Constitutional-
ism (and Vice Versa), 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1147 (2015) (analyzing the shift in public 
opinion favoring same-sex marriage and equating it with the recent legal devel-
opments moving in the same direction). 
 247. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUF-
FOLK U. L. REV. 751, 768 (1986). 
 248. Mandel et al., supra note 164, at 956. 
 249. Dan M. Kahan et al., The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and 
Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732 
(2012). 
 250. Mandel et al., supra note 164, at 937–43. 
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to engineering.251 Though formal legal reasoning and Justice 
ideology do a poor job of explaining Supreme Court intellectual 
property outcomes, public opinion does correlate with these re-
sults. 
Second, one of the strongest signatures that we see in the 
Supreme Court data is the divergence between the copyright 
cases and the patent and trademark cases. Research indicates 
that popular opinions about what intellectual property law 
should be are more consistent with copyright law than with pa-
tent law.252 This finding could explain a Court that is more likely 
to harmonize with the direction of Congress’s action in copyright 
than in patent law. 
Third, there is the wealth of unanimous decisions in intel-
lectual property cases during the period under study, a rate that 
exceeds unanimous decisions in other fields of law by nearly two 
to one. Public opinion influence on Supreme Court Justice voting 
can explain this unanimity quite clearly; most other explanatory 
mechanisms that have been offered cannot. 
Fourth, this proposition about intellectual property deci-
sions dovetails precisely with the types of cases in which public 
opinion is expected to hold the greatest sway. Recent studies of 
the relationship between popular preferences and Supreme 
Court decision-making find that the correlation is strongest in 
nonsalient and unpolarized cases.253 Intellectual property law 
fits this mold. The degree of unanimity in the intellectual prop-
erty cases shows that they tend not to be polarized at the 
Court.254 Salience is defined in the pertinent studies based on 
whether a given decision was reported on the front page of the 
New York Times.255 Only one of the forty-four Supreme Court 
 
 251. Id. at 949. 
 252. Gregory N. Mandel, The Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 261, 292 (2014). This study did not test trademark attitudes. 
 253. Casillas et al., supra note 200, at 83–84 (finding stronger effects in non-
salient cases); Unah et al., supra note 12, at 313–16 (finding the strongest ef-
fects in unpolarized, nonsalient cases). 
 254. Nonsalient cases do not necessarily tend to be unpolarized. Stephen 
Burbank and Sean Farhang found that Supreme Court cases concerning private 
enforcement rights, for a time period overlapping the present study, are also 
nonsalient, but highly polarized. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, The 
Subterranean Counterrevolution: The Supreme Court, the Media, and Litigation 
Reform, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 293, 314–19 (2016). 
 255. Casillas et al., supra note 200, at 81; Unah et al., supra note 12, at 309; 
see also Burbank & Farhang, supra note 254, at 10 (reporting that most mem-
bers of the public acquire their information about Supreme Court decisions from 
the mass media). 
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intellectual property decisions under discussion merited such 
coverage.256 The authors of one study even specifically identified 
patent law as a field that “may be highly consequential” but that 
is not salient for the public.257 The characteristics of intellectual 
property cases strongly align with the types of cases on which 
public opinion tends to have the greatest influence on the Court. 
Finally, additional support for the public-influence theory 
can be gleaned from a more nuanced unanimity analysis. While 
the Supreme Court reached unanimous decisions in 68% of its 
substantive intellectual property decisions, it was unanimous in 
only 40% of the intellectual property decisions coded as neutral 
in the dataset. In addition, of the Court’s twenty-three unani-
mous decisions in intellectual property cases that substantively 
strengthened or weakened rights, twenty-two were in patent and 
trademark. Thus, unanimity was achieved far more often in sub-
stantive patent cases (78%) and trademark cases (100%) than in 
substantive copyright cases (14%). The patent and trademark 
cases are precisely the areas in which the Supreme Court devi-
ates from Congress; in copyright law cases, the Court and Con-
gress remain in accord. Something is causing the Supreme Court 
to reach unanimous agreement in an overwhelming percentage 
of substantive patent and trademark decisions, but rarely in 
non-substantive decisions in these same fields or in copyright 
cases. In other words, it is not intellectual property law per se on 
which the Supreme Court tends to be unanimous, or even patent 
and trademark law in particular. Rather, it is substantive patent 
and trademark decisions that weaken intellectual property 
owner rights where the agreement is strong.258 Public sentiment 
leery of strong patent and trademark rights could explain this 
divergence; few other rationales appear able to do so. 
This unanimity evidence also indicates that the Supreme 
Court’s twenty-first-century intellectual property jurisprudence 
 
 256. Adam Liptak, Justices, 9–0, Bar Patenting Human Genes, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 13, 2013, at A1. 
 257. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About 
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1549 (2010). 
 258. Some commentators have attempted to explain the Court’s unanimity 
in patent cases as a result of the Court’s lack of expertise in the field and reac-
tion to the Federal Circuit. See Holbrook, supra note 58, at 71–77; see also Laura 
G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community 
Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 123–27 (2015) (discussing how the Fed-
eral Circuit functioning as an expert community may affect its interaction with 
the Supreme Court). This rationale, however, cannot explain the pattern of una-
nimity revealed here, which includes substantive trademark cases but not neu-
tral patent decisions. 
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is not simply a patent-specific reaction against the Federal Cir-
cuit or patent troll concerns. This is not to say that such issues 
played no role in the Court’s patent law cases, only that there 
are additional factors at play. In addition, even though the Court 
may not have been reacting to these issues directly, popular con-
cern about the direction of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence 
and patent trolls may have catalyzed the Supreme Court Jus-
tices’ views in these cases. Under this view, those who have ar-
gued that the Court responded to the Federal Circuit or patent 
troll rhetoric have the correlation correct, but fail to recognize 
the intermediary influence of public opinion driving this rela-
tionship. 
4. Mechanisms of Public Influence 
The evidence supporting the public opinion hypothesis 
raises questions concerning how popular sentiment might influ-
ence the Court and whether such sentiment concerning patent 
and trademark law can be identified. Epstein and Martin are ex-
plicit that they cannot identify the causal relationship between 
Supreme Court decisions and public mood from their data.259 
The dominant view, particularly in the political science litera-
ture, has been that Supreme Court decisions tend to align with 
public preferences because the Justices strategically bend to the 
will of the people in an effort to maintain public support and re-
main an effective, legitimate branch of government in the ab-
sence of popular election.260 This rationale has been theorized in 
relation to certain patent decisions.261 The same relationship, 
however, could also arise because Supreme Court Justices are 
human beings and members of the public; the same factors that 
affect public opinion generally may affect Supreme Court Jus-
tices as well.262 As Justice Ruth Ginsburg recently noted about 
 
 259. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 264. 
 260. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 14 (2009); Baum & Devins, supra note 257, at 1580; Unah et al., supra 
note 12, at 299; see also Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 264 n.3; Timothy 
R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 973, 
979–85 (2015) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s decisions in patent law 
cases may be an attempt to express a level of accountability); Yates et al., supra 
note 234, at 123–24. 
 261. Holbrook & Janis, supra note 260 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
subject matter cases support the patent system’s legitimacy by letting the public 
know, for example, that there are outer boundaries of what is patentable). 
 262. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 264, 281; Unah et al., supra note 
12, at 300; Yates et al., supra note 234, at 124–26. 
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the Court, “Inevitably, it will be affected by the climate of the 
era.”263 
Which of these two causal relationships is at play (the Court 
directly seeking to satisfy public preferences or indirectly being 
a part of the public mood) has been heavily debated.264 Several 
researchers have recently attempted to answer this question, 
but study design in this context is quite difficult and the results 
have been mixed.265 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in intellectual property cases 
shed new light on this question. Recall that intellectual property 
studies reveal that most members of the public have relatively 
limited knowledge about intellectual property issues and that in-
tellectual property issues tend not to align with traditional ideo-
logical debates.266 It would seem implausible, on this basis, to 
reason that the Supreme Court would feel the need to bend to 
the will of the public in order to achieve popular legitimacy on 
intellectual property law.267 
 
 263. Adam Liptak, Right Divided, Disciplined Left Steered Justices, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2015, at A21. A third possibility for a mechanism that some have 
proposed is the judicial appointments process, but this means of influence would 
imply static Supreme Court Justice preferences that are unaffected by changes 
in public opinion over time, a possibility that is belied by the data. Lain, supra 
note 234, at 160. 
 264. Baum & Devins, supra note 257, at 1547–55, 1562; Burbank & Far-
hang, supra note 254, at 303–07; Casillas et al., supra note 200, at 74–75; Ep-
stein & Martin, supra note 12, at 264 n.3; Yates et al., supra note 234, at 123–
26. 
 265. See, e.g., Casillas et al., supra note 200, at 78 (attempting to control for 
the social forces that might affect all individuals by creating a measure of na-
tional policy based on military spending and a measure of policy liberalism de-
rived from a set of economic indicators). Compare id. at 75 (concluding based on 
an empirical analysis “that while social forces indeed influence the justices’ ide-
ology. . .[,] controlling for these factors, public opinion maintains a statistically 
significant effect on the Court’s decisions”), with Micheal W. Giles et al., The 
Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages Between Pub-
lic Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 70. J. POL. 293, 303 (2008) (conclud-
ing based on an analysis of individual Justice’s votes that the “most likely ex-
planation” for the correlation between public opinion and Supreme Court 
decisions is the Justices being swayed by the same forces that also influence the 
public). 
 266. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 267. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 254, at 319–20 (concluding that 
the Supreme Court is less constrained by popular opinion on issues of lower 
public visibility). Some scholars, conversely, have argued that Justices may feel 
a need to bend to the will of the public in nonsalient cases to build a reservoir 
of diffuse public support that enables them to buck popular preferences in more 
salient cases. Casillas et al., supra note 200, at 81–82. As others have stated, it 
is hard to imagine that this reservoir is necessary given that (1) the Court’s 
“legitimacy is largely impervious to [public] disagreement” with its decisions, 
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The correlation between Supreme Court decisions and pop-
ular preferences on intellectual property issues appears much 
more likely to result from the fact that the Supreme Court Jus-
tices are members of a public whose opinions are shaped by the 
events and forces that influence society more generally. It is cer-
tainly possible that the Supreme Court is also acting strategi-
cally at the same time, as these causal mechanisms are not mu-
tually exclusive.268 But the data here indicate that the 
previously less appreciated effects of Supreme Court Justices be-
ing part and parcel of their time and culture are having a signif-
icant effect in at least some fields. 
Some Justices have made statements that are in accord with 
this analysis. Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote: “Judges, 
so long as they are relatively normal human beings, can no more 
escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run than 
can people working at other jobs.”269 Justice Benjamin Cardozo 
reflected, “The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of 
men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by.”270 
Even Justice Antonin Scalia, a longtime proponent of an 
originalist approach to interpretation, has acknowledged, “[I]t’s 
a little unrealistic to talk about the Court as though it’s a con-
tinuous, unchanging institution rather than to some extent nec-
essarily a reflection of the society in which it functions.”271 
That the Supreme Court appears to be influenced by the 
public mood, regardless of the mechanism, raises a subsequent 
issue of trying to determine which segment of the public is influ-
encing the Court. Though Epstein and Martin’s work focused on 
national public mood data,272 subsequent empirical research in-
dicates that micro-publics, rather than broad-based national 
public opinion, are a more accurate indicator of Justice decision-
making.273 Justices, like everyone else, have a variety of per-
sonal, social, and work relationships that can be expected to 
 
and (2) the Court would be hard-pressed to build public support in nonsalient 
intellectual property cases given the public’s lack of attention to such matters. 
Baum & Devins, supra note 257, at 1548–52. 
 268. Yates et al., supra note 234, at 126. 
 269. Rehnquist, supra note 247. 
 270. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 
(1921). 
 271. Yates et al., supra note 234, at 138–39 (quoting McGuire & Stimson, 
supra note 246, at 1020). 
 272. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 269. 
 273. Yates et al., supra note 234, at 137–38. 
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shape their perceptions and beliefs.274 In the case of Supreme 
Court Justices, these relationships tend to be among societal 
“elites,” individuals of higher education and socioeconomic sta-
tus than the general public.275 For the Justices, this would likely 
include lawyers and legal communities in particular. As Profes-
sors Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins concluded after a compre-
hensive analysis of prior studies and new data, “[The evidence] 
supports the conclusion that elites are more important to the 
Justices, and exert more impact on their choices, than does the 
public as a whole.”276 It is not surprising that Justices would be 
more affected by the populations that they are a part of and iden-
tify with because such populations are presumably the most im-
portant to the Justices.277 
Though the evidence discussed above indicates that most 
people pay little attention to, and have limited knowledge of, in-
tellectual property issues, there is evidence that the higher soci-
oeconomic status cohort that Supreme Court Justices are a part 
of may be paying more attention.278 An analysis of the use of the 
term “intellectual property” in news articles in the New York 
Times, in Westlaw’s news databases, and in sources available on 
Google Books all indicate a dramatic rise in the use of the term 
from the 1980s through the present day. In each case, there is 
continually increasing use of the term in every five-year block 
from 1980 through 2015, with the phrase being used over forty 
times more often presently than it was thirty-five years ago.279 
 
 274. Id. at 128–35 (detailing various correlations between Justices’ voting 
behavior and different aspects of their lives). 
 275. Baum & Devins, supra note 257, at 1579–80. The Supreme Court’s de-
cisions “on controversial social issues are more consistent with the views of 
highly educated people than with the views of the populace as a whole.” Id. at 
1570–71. 
 276. Id. at 1579. It appears that this effect may be particularly true of swing 
Justices. Id. at 1581. 
 277. Id. at 1537–38. 
 278. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 254, at 300–03 (discussing how 
studies have demonstrated that the public in general “knows little about the 
Court’s decisions,” but that the better-educated, more-attentive public is better 
informed). 
 279. A search of articles appearing in the New York Times for the term “in-
tellectual property” yields the following numbers of hits for the identified time 
periods: 1/1/1981–12/31/1985, 49; 1/1/1986–12/31/1990, 291; 1/1/1991–
12/31/1995, 398; 1/1/1996–12/31/2000, 721; 1/1/2001–12/31/2005, 1,009; 
1/1/2006–12/31/2010, 1,402; 1/1/2011–12/31/2015, 1,683. A search of Westlaw’s 
databases for the term “intellectual property” yields the following numbers of 
hits for the identified time periods: 1/1/1981–12/31/1985, 1,392; 1/1/1986–
12/31/1990, 2,743; 1/1/1991–12/31/1995, 9,203; 1/1/1996–12/31/2000, 25,109; 
1/1/2001–12/31/2005, 47,227; 1/1/2006–12/31/2010, 54,705; 1/1/2011–
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In addition to greater public attention to intellectual prop-
erty law among elites, the Justices have seen a vast increase in 
the scope of amicus briefs filed in intellectual property cases, 
both seeking certiorari and on the merits.280 Several of the Jus-
tices have also interacted directly with intellectual property law: 
they have written on intellectual property issues,281 have had 
law clerks or close relatives who are experts in intellectual prop-
erty law,282 and have argued intellectual property cases and de-
cided intellectual property cases as appellate and district court 
judges.283 As a result, there are a variety of manners in which 
elite attention to intellectual property law is likely working its 
way into Supreme Court Justice consciousness. 
This suite of circumstantial evidence is not definitive, but 
combining it appears to paint a picture that more-educated, 
wealthier, legally-attuned individuals paid substantially more 
attention to intellectual property issues during the time period 
 
12/31/2015, 55,034. Google Books data is via a search of the term “intellectual 
property” on Google Books’ “Ngram Viewer,” available at https://books.google 
.com/ngrams. 
 280. Balganesh, supra note 202, at 1594; Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus 
Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 395, 399 (2011); see amicus briefs cited infra note 294. 
 281. See Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 
(1972); Breyer, supra note 229. 
 282. To note a handful of examples, the following judges, scholars, and prac-
titioners all specialize in intellectual property law: Richard Taranto, Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals Circuit Judge, clerked for Justice O’Connor; Kevin Col-
lins, Professor of Law at Washington University Law School, clerked for Justice 
Sotomayor while she was on the Second Circuit; Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pauline 
Newman Professor of Law at NYU Law School, clerked for Chief Justice Burger; 
Jeanne Fromer, Professor of Law at NYU Law School, clerked for Justice 
Souter; Jane Ginsburg, Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic 
Property Law at Columbia Law School, is Justice Ginsburg’s daughter; John 
Golden, Loomer Family Professor in Law at the University of Texas Law School, 
clerked for Justice Breyer; Scott Hemphill, Professor of Law at NYU Law 
School, clerked for Justice Scalia; Lawrence Lessig, Roy L. Furman Professor of 
Law at Harvard Law School, clerked for Justice Scalia; Ronald Mann, Albert E. 
Cinelli Enterprise Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, clerked for Justice 
Powell; Molly Van Houwelling, Associate Dean at Berkeley, clerked for Justice 
Souter; Jeffrey Wall, Special Counsel at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, clerked for 
Justice Thomas; Timothy Wu, Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law at 
Columbia Law School, clerked for Justice Breyer. 
 283. E.g., Justice Roberts argued both TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Dis-
plays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255, Transcript of Oral Argument at 2 (2000) (No. 99-
1571), 2000 WL 1808274, at *2 and Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 
118 S. Ct. 1279, Transcript of Oral Argument at 2 (1998) (No. 96-1768), 1998 
WL 29550, at *2; Justice Kagan was involved with several intellectual property 
cases in her service as Solicitor General from 2009–2010. E.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010). 
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in question, and at the same time displayed a growing concern 
about the strength of intellectual property rights.284 Supreme 
Court Justices, as members of these micro-publics, may well 
have been affected in the same manner. 
C. REEVALUATING THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESSIONAL 
INFLUENCES 
That elite popular opinion appears to play an underappreci-
ated role in influencing Supreme Court decision-making on in-
tellectual property issues raises the question of why Congress 
does not appear to be swayed by similar constituent preferences. 
Completing the cycle of flipping the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty, legal scholars and political scientists have produced a va-
riety of evidence and analyses indicating that the theoretically 
representative branches of government often act in counterma-
joritarian ways.285 Special interest group influence is one strong 
example of such an effect. A variety of other work has identified 
democratic failings in the elected branches of government that 
have similar consequences. Myriad well-known challenges can 
limit democratic accountability, including political polarization, 
social choice voting issues, the Senate filibuster, committee 
roles, gerrymandered electoral districts, incumbency protection, 
and other influences.286 As Corinna Lain writes, “This recogni-
tion turns the countermajoritarian difficulty on its head . . . . In-
stead of a countermajoritarian Court checking the majoritarian 
branches, we see a majoritarian Court checking the not-so-ma-
joritarian branches.”287 The results of the instant study of judi-
 
 284. While more-educated, wealthier individuals tend to prefer stronger in-
tellectual property rights relative to less-educated, less-wealthy individuals, 
they still believe that intellectual property rights are too strong. Mandel et al., 
supra note 164, at 970. 
 285. FRIEDMAN, supra note 260; Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 361, 362 (2008) (“[S]cholarly concern with democratic deficits in Amer-
ican constitutionalism has shifted from the courts to electoral institutions.”); 
Lain, supra note 234, at 120–44. 
 286. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46–60 
(1951); Lain, supra note 234, at 115–16, 148; Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center 
Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. 
L. REV. 273, 329–30 (2011). 
 287. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS 
SERVE AMERICA 4 (2006); Lain, supra note 234, at 116. But see Friedman, supra 
note 235, at 370 (describing how the Marshall Court’s treatment of the Burr 
conspiracy trials was met by public outrage). 
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cial and legislative action in the first part of the twenty-first cen-
tury adds intellectual property to the list of fields in which the 
Supreme Court appears to be acting in a more majoritarian man-
ner than Congress. This is significant as intellectual property is 
the first area of private law in which this trend has been identi-
fied.288 
How did this situation arise in intellectual property law? As 
with many social and cultural phenomena, there are likely an 
eclectic set of forces at play that operate in varied manners. It 
would be implausible to identify all the influences that have had 
an impact, but one factor that likely played a significant role for 
intellectual property was a shift in innovative industries’ rela-
tionship to patent law. The growth of the information technology 
and software industries in the 1990s led to the rise of economi-
cally and politically powerful industry segments and several of 
today’s largest companies (including Google, Amazon, and Face-
book) that interact with patent law in a significantly different 
manner than traditional industries.289 Rather than viewing pa-
tent protection as a necessary means to be able to profit off of 
innovation and intellectual assets, large industry players in the 
information technology and software industries sometimes en-
counter patenting as a barrier to innovation.290 This perception 
may arise because of companies’ needs to design around other 
entities’ patents, to license necessary patented infrastructure, or 
concern over (potentially frivolous) lawsuits by parties who claim 
infringement of a patent that may have had little to do with cur-
rent products.291 The rise of powerful industries that view 
stronger patent protection as problematic led to historic clashes 
throughout the period in question between information technol-
 
 288. Prior work in this vein has generally focused on public law issues in-
volving civil liberties. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 234, at 116 n.11, 119–44 (sur-
veying prior work in this area as well as discussing her own). 
 289. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137, at 49–58, 156–58; Ronald J. Mann, 
Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 
968–98 (2005). 
 290. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137, at 156–58; Mandel, supra note 184, 
at 23; Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation: From Patent Racing to Patent War, 
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1891, 1895 (2012) (stating “there are good reasons to 
believe that patents may also impede innovation by creating barriers to compe-
tition”). 
 291. Barnett, supra note 184, at 440–41; Robert P. Merges, Software and 
Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1631–32 
(2007). 
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ogy and software industry groups on the one hand, and pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology industry groups on the other.292 The 
six-year debate over the AIA described above represents a prime 
example;293 these factions also butted heads in many of the Su-
preme Court cases analyzed earlier as well.294 
Intriguingly, the entities arguing for weaker patent protec-
tion appear to have gotten the better of the public perception de-
bates, or at least the better of the elite public opinion perceptions 
that Supreme Court Justices are more likely to be influenced by 
and be a part of. Recent data indicates that this success may not 
simply be the result of the information technology and software 
industries having had the better position or having made better 
arguments. Rather, researchers have found that the American 
public is more receptive to arguments in favor of weaker intel-
lectual property protection than they are to arguments in favor 
of stronger protection.295 
This account appears plausible as an explanation for the Su-
preme Court’s decision-making in patent cases, but does not ex-
plain their action in trademark cases (where the Court was sim-
ilarly hostile to intellectual property rights) or copyright cases 
(where the Court supported stronger protection). The trademark 
valence could have flowed on the coattails of public opinion con-
cerning patent law. For people who do not focus in intellectual 
property law, drawing distinctions between the various areas 
within intellectual property can appear somewhat nuanced. In 
 
 292. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137, at 100–02; Anderson, supra note 141, 
at 982–84; David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Pa-
tent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 135–36, 149 n.124 (2009); see also Anderson, su-
pra note 59, at 1075; Matal, Part I, supra note 137, at 453–66 (detailing the 
intense legislative debate concerning passage of the AIA). 
 293. Supra Part I.B.4. 
 294. See, e.g., Brief for Google, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (No. 13-298), 
2014 WL 828041; Brief for Genentech, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1098262; Brief for Biotechnology Indus. Org. 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prome-
theus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 5373695; Brief 
for Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 
10-1150), 2011 WL 5373698. 
 295. Anne A. Fast et al., Experimental Investigations on the Basis for Intel-
lectual Property Rights, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 458, 470–71 (2016). 
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fact, the lay public tends not to distinguish their opinions be-
tween the different areas of intellectual property law.296 Fur-
ther, though patent law and trademark law are strikingly differ-
ent fields, they may be linked in popular perception due to the 
existence of the PTO. In particular, much of the criticism that 
was leveled against patent law in the past decade-plus was di-
rected at the PTO itself.297 
Why is there a difference in the Supreme Court’s copyright 
jurisprudence? The empirical study of Supreme Court ideology 
discussed earlier, based on intellectual property decisions from 
1954 to 2006, similarly found that the Supreme Court tended to 
favor copyright owners to a greater extent than patent or trade-
mark owners.298 The authors hypothesized that this difference 
might arise (a) because copyright infringers are only liable for 
actual copying (whereas independent inventors can be liable for 
patent infringement); (b) because Supreme Court Justices as 
writers may be “more sympathetic to the romantic myth of the 
author underlying copyright [law]”; or (c) because the Justices 
are less concerned about overbreadth in copyright protection due 
to its numerous exceptions and limitations.299 As discussed 
above, recent data indicates that public preferences tend to align 
with copyright law to a greater extent than patent law, perhaps 
resulting in less pushback against stronger copyright protection 
at the Court.300 Though none of these explanations is definitive, 
the analysis in the current study extends the prior study’s find-
ing: over a period spanning more than sixty years, the Supreme 
 
 296. See Mandel et al., supra note 164, at 966–68 (noting little difference in 
public perception across intellectual property fields with respect to a variety of 
factors). 
 297. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from A Quasi-Exper-
iment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 615 (2015) (“Many believe the root cause of the 
patent system’s dysfunction is that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO 
or Agency) is issuing too many invalid patents that unnecessarily drain con-
sumer welfare, stunt productive research, and unreasonably extract rents from 
innovators.”); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2001) (stating that the PTO has been criticized “for fail-
ing to do a serious job of examining patents, thus allowing bad patents to slip 
through the system”); Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 990, 990–91 (2013) (explaining that the USPTO “has come under 
fire for issuing patents of questionable quality. . . . [And] [a]side from being 
technically invalid, commentators have argued that such patents are worthless 
and burdensome on the patent system”) (footnotes omitted). 
 298. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 840–42. 
 299. Id. at 841–42. 
 300. Supra Part II.B.3. 
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Court has been more supportive of stronger copyright protection 
than of protection in other fields of intellectual property law. 
If Supreme Court jurisprudence is being driven by popular 
opinion, the Court’s long-term trend of supporting copyright pro-
tection could be coming to an end. The recent pushback against 
the SOPA and PIPA legislation included widespread popular op-
position to expanding copyright protection.301 To the extent the 
Supreme Court is swayed by these same forces, as indicated by 
the present analysis, the Justices may be less accommodating of 
copyright protection in the future than they have been histori-
cally. 
III.  NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERBRANCH 
CONFLICT   
Part I of this Article presented an empirical analysis demon-
strating a divergence between the Supreme Court’s and Con-
gress’s intellectual property activity in the first part of the 
twenty-first century. Digging deeper into the data, this diver-
gence arises from the two branches moving in different direc-
tions on patent law and trademark law; the branches are in ac-
cord on copyright protection. Part II built on this insight to 
provide an analysis of the political and social mechanisms that 
may be producing Congress and the Supreme Court’s opposing 
perspectives. In the intellectual property context, Congress ap-
pears to be driven in significant part by special interest group 
influence, while the Supreme Court’s decisions tend to reflect 
elite popular opinion. Part III shifts from uncovering new evi-
dence and trends to a normative examination of what these find-
ings mean for intellectual property law. The conflict between 
Congress and the Supreme Court has significant implications for 
governmental efficiency, majoritarian democracy, and achieving 
the objectives of intellectual property law. 
A. GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY 
One inference from the extended breach between the 
branches of government is that it produces high transaction 
costs for settling law. Our government is designed as a system of 
checks and balances under which it is appropriate for the Su-
 
 301. Evan Engstrom, Five Years Later: What the SOPA/PIPA Protest Meant 
for Tech, ENGINE (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.engine.is/news/category/five-years 
-later-what-the-sopapipa-protest-meant-for-tech; supra Part II.A.2.  
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preme Court to strike down unconstitutional laws, and for Con-
gress to override non-constitutionally based Supreme Court in-
terpretations of law to better achieve congressional intent.302 
But, when the government is functioning as it is traditionally 
conceived, these instances should be relatively rare and not play 
out continuously across entire fields of law.303 
Some models of judicial decision-making hypothesize that 
courts’ appropriate role is to fine-tune broad congressional legis-
lation that cannot be comprehensive due to a variety of legisla-
tive practicalities.304 In this view, the Judicial and Legislative 
Branches are not in tension; rather, courts step in to fill a void 
left by necessarily incomplete legislation.305 If the incomplete-
legislation hypothesis was the full explanation for intellectual 
property law, however, one would expect the Supreme Court 
cases to be balanced between strengthening and weakening 
owner rights. The strong bias displayed in the data towards 
weakening protection, particularly in contrast to the thrust of 
legislative activity, contradicts this neutral explanation. 
Both Congress and the Supreme Court are very expensive 
governmental bodies.306 Legislation is costly and slow.307 Any 
space on the Supreme Court’s docket is a precious resource, as 
 
 302. WILLIAM J. RICH, 3 MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 37:1 (3d ed. 2011); 
see Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of 
Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1203–04 (2014); David H. Moore, Taking Cues 
from Congress: Judicial Review, Congressional Authorization, and the Expan-
sion of Presidential Power, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1027–28 (2015). 
 303. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional 
Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1331–41 (2014) (reporting a low background rate of congres-
sional overrides of Supreme Court decisions, with some increase starting in 
1974, a particularly high rate from 1991–1998, and a very low rate since 1998); 
Ryan Eric Emenaker, Constitutional Interpretation and Congressional Over-
rides, 3 J.L. 197, 203 (2013) (reporting a historical congressional override rate 
of less than one a year from 1803 to 2010); Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dia-
logue? Political Polarization, The Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 205, 209 (2013) (reporting that Congress passed overrides of Supreme 
Court statutory decisions fewer than three times per Term from 2001–2012). 
 304. Tonja Jacobi, The Role of Politics and Economics in Explaining Varia-
tion in Litigation Rates in the U.S. States, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 207–13 (2009). 
 305. Id.; Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of 
Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 401 
(2005). 
 306. STEVEN S. SMITH ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 328 (8th ed. 2013); 
Michael W. Bowers & Richard C. Cortner, Financing Constitutional Litigation: 
Pursuing the Watergate Principle, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 573, 573 (1987). 
 307. SMITH ET AL., supra note 306, at 105–06. 
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the Court hears less than ninety cases a year.308 To the extent 
that a relatively similar level of patent or trademark protection 
could be achieved simply by both branches acting less, the gov-
ernment could save substantial resources and free each body to 
attend to other pressing needs. 
Obviously, the intellectual property statutes and judicial de-
cisions at issue here are not precise trade-offs in terms of protec-
tion (with the clear exception of Congress’s legislative override 
of the Supreme Court’s Moseley decision),309 but the conceptual 
point remains the same. Given the breadth of many of the Su-
preme Court’s decisions, the variety of Congress’s legislation, 
and the consistently contrary approaches of each branch in pa-
tent and trademark law, the body of law-making over the past 
fourteen years in these fields cannot be written off as each 
branch fine-tuning in complement to each other. Rather, the two 
branches of government appear to be expending significant re-
sources in an oppositional mire. 
B. MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY 
From the perspective of democratic values, whether the Su-
preme Court’s activity in intellectual property cases over the 
past fourteen years is a beneficial or harmful development de-
pends significantly on one’s view of Congress’s legislative func-
tion and motivation in passing intellectual property laws. Con-
gress is designed under the Constitution to be the more 
representative branch of government and is expected to reflect 
the popular will.310 As discussed above, however, there are myr-
iad practical realities of legislative action that often preclude 
Congress from representing constituents’ best interests or acting 
in a manner that reflects their democratic will.311 Where Con-
gress’s democratic functioning breaks down, such as when it leg-
islates in response to special interest preferences rather than 
based on constituent interests or legislators’ view of what is best 
 
 308. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitu-
tional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 868 (2004); Nancy 
Morawetz, Counterbalancing Distorted Incentives in Supreme Court Pro Bono 
Practice: Recommendations for the New Supreme Court Pro Bono Bar and Pub-
lic Interest Practice Communities, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 139 (2011); The Su-
preme Court at Work, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www 
.supremecourt.gov/about/courtatwork.aspx. 
 309. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 310. Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declaration of Independ-
ence, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 693, 724, 731 (2012). 
 311. Lain, supra note 234, at 157; supra Part II.A.2. 
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for society, it is no longer operating in its designed majoritarian 
role.312 
Ironically, in these circumstances, the Supreme Court may 
be better able than Congress to reflect the will of the majority.313 
The empirical evidence and political theory analyzed above indi-
cate that the Supreme Court is often responsive to popular opin-
ion.314 Regardless of whether this response occurs because the 
Supreme Court is actively pursuing public preferences in an ef-
fort to maintain legitimacy or (as the evidence in the intellectual 
property cases suggest) because the Justices are members of the 
public, the outcome is the same. Under such conditions, the Su-
preme Court might be more likely to promote majoritarian out-
comes than Congress.315 
This approach may appear particularly appropriate to the 
extent Congress is perceived as captured by special interests. 
One goal of the Framers of the Constitution in designing a sys-
tem of government with separation of powers was to address the 
problem of faction.316 To the extent Congress is controlled by spe-
cial interests, it is fitting for the Court to step in and protect the 
public interest from factional self-interest. Attributing the 
Court’s intellectual property decision-making to such proper 
democratic functioning, however, is likely too rosy-eyed a view. 
If the Court is intentionally protecting the public interest in pa-
tent and trademark cases, it is hard to understand how the Court 
could view Congress’s copyright legislation as less influenced by 
special interests. 
An alternative explanation is that the Supreme Court offers 
an outlet for majoritarian democratic results because passing 
legislation in Congress is often extremely difficult.317 There are 
 
 312. Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1553 (2000); Lain, supra note 234, at 115–16. 
 313. Lain, supra note 234, at 117. 
 314. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 315. Lain, supra note 234, at 117. 
 316. DAN T. COENEN, THE STORY OF THE FEDERALIST: HOW HAMILTON AND 
MADISON RECONCEIVED AMERICA 84, 96–97, 158, 269 n.21 (2007). 
 317. Jacobi, supra note 304, at 207–10; Lain, supra note 234, at 157–58; 
Terri Peretti, Democracy-Assisting Judicial Review and the Challenge of Parti-
san Polarization, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 843, 844–45, 857–58 (2014). 
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many reasons why it is very hard to get a bill, even a well-sup-
ported bill, through Congress.318 Supreme Court decision-mak-
ing, on the other hand, is more fluid and often faster.319 Under 
this view, where issues arise for which there is popular will but 
legislative inaction, pressure on the Supreme Court to act may 
arise precisely because Congress is not responding to the will of 
the people.320 Supreme Court decisions consistent with public 
opinion in these circumstances could achieve what Congress 
should have done in the first instance, but could not. Thus, the 
Supreme Court may effectively achieve democratic-like out-
comes, not through majoritarian processes, but by producing ma-
joritarian results (or, micro-public majoritarian results).321 
The nuance in this final point is an important one. Even 
where the Supreme Court helps to achieve majoritarian prefer-
ences, it still is not acting in a democratic manner.322 Reflecting 
popular will does not change the fact that the Court is not popu-
larly elected. This difference raises a fundamental question 
about the structure of government: Is it enough that the system 
achieves a majoritarian result, or does government have to 
achieve that result in the desired democratic manner? It is po-
tentially problematic that the Supreme Court cedes to popular 
will because this indicates that the Court may be abdicating its 
constitutional role of checking Congress and the President.323 Al-
exander Hamilton recognized the Supreme Court as “an excel-
lent barrier” against “the encroachments and oppressions of the 
representative body,” “an essential safeguard against the effects 
of occasional ill humors in the society.”324 In other words, even if 
the Supreme Court achieves the majoritarian result, doing so 
could threaten the Constitution’s model of government because 
there is no longer any entity guarding against the potential tyr-
anny of the majority.325 These lofty concerns may be less of an 
 
 318. E.g., John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: 
How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 L. LIBR. J. 131, 133–
35 (2013); Peretti, supra note 317, at 857–58; Barbara Sinclair, Is Congress Now 
the Broken Branch?, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 703, 718–19 (2014). 
 319. Lain, supra note 234, at 157. 
 320. Id. at 168. 
 321. Id. at 117. 
 322. See Strauss, supra note 246, at 903. 
 323. Id. at 905–06. 
 324. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465, 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 325. Adam Burton, Pay No Attention to the Men Behind the Curtain: The 
Supreme Court, Popular Culture, and the Countermajoritarian Problem, 
73 UMKC L. REV. 53, 56 (2004) (“The framers justified the judiciary’s power to 
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issue in intellectual property law than in fundamental rights 
cases, but the intellectual property decisions provide new evi-
dence that this concern is a real one. Those who believe that 
proper democratic procedure forms the backbone of a well-func-
tioning society will not be satisfied with the Supreme Court 
achieving majoritarian ends if it is not being accomplished 
through appropriate democratic means. 
C. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 
The core question for intellectual property law is identifying 
which branch of government, Congress or the Supreme Court, is 
more likely to effect intellectual property laws that achieve so-
cially desirable objectives. The answer to this question turns 
somewhat on whether one takes an instrumentalist or deonto-
logical view of the goals of intellectual property law. 
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution grants 
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts” by enacting copyright and patent laws.326 Con-
sistent with this consequentialist preamble, the dominant view 
of intellectual property law and policy in the United States has 
often been that intellectual property law exists in order to incen-
tivize creative and innovative activity.327 The incentive theory of 
intellectual property law is based on the rationale that providing 
authors and inventors with the potential for intellectual prop-
erty rights will induce them to engage in greater innovative ac-
tivity than they would otherwise, from the creation to the pro-
duction to the commercialization of intellectual works.328 
 
invalidate legislation as a necessary legal check on popular opinion to protect 
minorities against a ‘tyranny of the majority.’”); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Su-
preme Court A “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 105 (2010) 
(“For better or worse, the Court does not and cannot protect political minorities, 
be they the ‘discrete and insular minorities’ of liberal jurisprudential fame, or 
any other kind of minority.”). 
 326. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 327. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) (“[I]t is acknowledged that 
analysis and evaluation of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted 
within an economic framework that seeks to align that law with the dictates of 
economic efficiency.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual 
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2012) (“According to the dominant Ameri-
can theory of intellectual property, copyright and patent laws are premised on 
providing creators with . . . incentive[s] to create artistic, scientific, and techno-
logical works . . . .”). 
 328. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL AGE 11–14 (5th ed. 2010); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher 
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Other scholars and experts rely on John Locke’s labor theory 
of property rights and similar concepts to argue that intellectual 
property law exists to protect authors’ and inventors’ natural 
rights in their creative works.329 This deontological perspective 
views individuals as automatically entitled to the fruits of their 
efforts.330 Natural rights theory supports intellectual property 
protection on the basis that a creator is morally entitled to con-
trol the copying and distribution of inventions or artistic crea-
tions produced as a result of the creator’s own labor and effort.331 
Under the traditional, romantic view of the branches of gov-
ernment enshrined in the Constitution, those who believe in a 
deontological basis might tend to favor Congress as the intellec-
tual property law decision-maker and be wary of Supreme Court 
interference. Natural rights in intellectual property law are an 
ill-defined concept, and majoritarian preferences could be an ap-
propriate way to define such rights.332 In fact, experts who sup-
port natural rights concepts in intellectual property law often 
 
Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 3–4 (2010); Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellec-
tual Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 926–27 (2010). 
 329. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equal-
ity and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 
1533, 1540 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 
GEO. L.J. 287, 296–330 (1988) (discussing Locke’s labor theory as it relates to 
intellectual property rights). 
 330. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 34–41 
(2011). 
 331. See Gordon, supra note 329, at 1543 (“[A]ll persons have a duty not to 
interfere with the resources others have appropriated or produced by laboring 
on the common.”); Hughes, supra note 329, at 297 (“Locke proposes that . . . 
there are enough unclaimed goods so that everyone can appropriate the objects 
of his labors without infringing upon goods that have been appropriated by 
someone else.”). There are additional perspectives on the objectives of intellec-
tual property law, such as that it should serve expressive ends. Fromer, supra 
note 327, at 1754–56 (discussing application of personhood theories to patent 
law); Hughes, supra note 329, at 330–65 (discussing different theories of self-
expression in intellectual property). Such other perspectives, however, tend to 
receive far less support than the ones identified above and are a poor match for 
explaining much actual intellectual property law. MERGES, supra note 330, at 
34–41; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1575, 1597–99 (2003); Fromer, supra note 328, at 1746–51. 
 332. See Gordon, supra note 329, at 1547, 1549, 1553. Congress’s protection 
of intellectual property rights is, of course, distinct from their protection (or not) 
of other rights. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing 
the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 615–16 
(1991) (explaining shifts in Congress’s and the Supreme Court’s positions on 
civil rights over time); Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, 
the Court, and the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J.L. & POL. 381, 383 (2000) (discussing 
Congress’s shifting approach to civil rights). 
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point to popular opinion and perceptions as evidence corroborat-
ing their views about what intellectual property rights should 
be.333 
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, may appear more 
attractive to consequentialist proponents. Rather than deciding 
intellectual property rights based on popular vote, achieving op-
timal incentives requires balancing the incentive benefits that 
intellectual property protection provides against the exclusion-
ary costs that it creates.334 The Supreme Court, not Congress, 
may be better able to engage in this calculated weighing. In sup-
port of this perspective, the Supreme Court has affirmed the in-
centive objectives of intellectual property law in numerous opin-
ions, recognizing the need to balance the incentives of protection 
against intellectual property rights “not inhibit[ing] further dis-
covery.”335 
The findings reported here invert this traditional reasoning 
about the branches of government. To the extent that Congress 
is driven by special interest lobbying rather than majoritarian 
 
 333. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The 
Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 1343, 1345–46 (1989) (“The special burdens scholars place on copyright 
may have their origins in public perception. There is often a distrust of copyright 
when its compulsions conflict with the usual expectations people have of the 
freedoms they should be entitled to exercise over their physical possessions.”) 
(footnote omitted). See generally, JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREA-
TORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015) (reporting 
on attitudes concerning creativity and intellectual property rights from an ex-
tensive series of interviews with a variety of people involved in the creative pro-
cess). 
 334. Barnett, supra note 184, at 395; Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 328, at 
923; Gregory N. Mandel, Leveraging the International Economy of Intellectual 
Property, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 736 (2014); Mandel, supra note 34, at 1453–54. 
 335. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1301 (2012); see id. at 1305 (“[T]he promise of exclusive rights provides mone-
tary incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery.”); Eldred v. Ash-
croft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he grant of exclusive 
rights [in the Intellectual Property clause] is intended to encourage the creativ-
ity of ‘Authors and Inventors.’”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the 
labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[C]opyright supplies the economic incentive 
to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (granting patents and copyrights is “intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors”); United States v. Par-
amount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The sole interest of the United 
States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the 
general benefits derived by the public.” (quoting Fox Film Corps. v. Doyal, 286 
U.S. 123, 127 (1932))). 
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public preferences, it will be a poor representative for defining 
natural rights in intellectual property works. Congress will pass 
laws to satisfy rent-seeking industry interests rather than the 
natural rights of authors and inventors. Conversely, the Su-
preme Court may now look more attractive to natural rights pro-
ponents, as it is the governmental body that actually adheres 
more closely to the public will.336 As the Court appears to decide 
patent and trademark cases in accord with public opinion, re-
gardless of what the Court writes about incentives in its deci-
sions, the Court may actually be a good mechanism for setting 
natural rights consistent with popular preferences. 
Though Congress may no longer appear attractive to deon-
tists, instrumentalists may want to take a second look. Rather 
than bending to popular preferences, Congress appears more re-
sponsive to industry preferences, and industry will often have 
better information and expertise concerning how to achieve 
greater incentives. For industries in which there are strong rep-
resentatives who want to strengthen and strong representatives 
who want to weaken intellectual property rights in order to sup-
port innovation, this buffeting from each side could produce law 
that actually takes both the benefits and costs of intellectual 
property into account.337 Current patent law debates may pro-
vide such an example. With powerful industry representatives 
on both sides of the issues, the only laws that can get passed may 
be ones that are relatively accommodating to innovation in mul-
tiple contexts.338 This argument could easily be overstated. As 
noted earlier, legislation is difficult to pass and powerful indus-
try groups on both sides of the debate may uniformly favor cer-
tain laws that simply provide barriers to entry, but are likely 
harmful to innovation.339 Overall, however, Congress may be 
more accommodating to incentive pressures in certain circum-
stances than originally thought. 
In the end, neither instrumentalists nor deontists will likely 
feel satisfied with either the Supreme Court or Congress as a 
reliable option for setting intellectual property law and policy. 
Special interest group influence is a poor way to decide intellec-
 
 336. The Court is certainly informed of special interest positions, as the 
wealth of amicus briefs filed with the Court attests, but does not appear to be 
as influenced by such positions as Congress. See supra notes 280, 294. 
 337. Mandel, supra note 184, at 55. 
 338. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 339. See supra Part II.C. 
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tual property rights, but majoritarian popular preferences on is-
sues implicating specialized knowledge may not be much better. 
  CONCLUSION   
This analysis of Supreme Court and congressional decision-
making in intellectual property law in the first part of the 
twenty-first century does not paint a rosy picture. The Supreme 
Court and Congress appear fractured concerning intellectual 
property law and neither branch appears to be functioning in its 
proper governmental role. Congress seems to have abandoned its 
position of serving as a representative of the people on intellec-
tual property issues, and the Supreme Court appears to have ab-
dicated its responsibility to guard minority interests against the 
tyranny of the majority. There is, however, a potential silver lin-
ing in this cloud of weak institutional competence, one that may 
be welcome news for intellectual property advocates and schol-
ars. 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court studies indicate that 
the Court tends not to follow majority public preferences in gen-
eral, but rather the opinion of the micro-publics that the Justices 
are a part of.340 In fact, when Supreme Court decisions deviate 
from mainstream public opinion, they tend to deviate in the di-
rection of elite popular preferences.341 The elite public opinion 
that appears to influence Supreme Court Justice voting the most 
is likely that of well-educated, legally sophisticated actors.342 
This relationship provides a direct avenue for intellectual prop-
erty scholars and experts to help influence the development of 
intellectual property law. One does not need to have the ear of a 
Supreme Court Justice directly to have an effect; influencing in-
tellectual property perceptions among legally elite groups may 
be enough to cause a shift in the course of the law. Contrary to 
the received wisdom,343 legal scholarship and scholarly advocacy 
may be a successful avenue for legal change. 
 
 340. See Lain, supra note 234, at 164 (noting that Supreme Court Justices 
are not average members of the public, but elites); Yates et al., supra note 234, 
at 139–40. 
 341. Lain, supra note 234, at 164–65; Strauss, supra note 246, at 895. 
 342. Baum & Devins, supra note 257, at 1537–38; Strauss, supra note 246, 
at 895. 
 343. See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 563, 563 (2009) (critiquing the “potential role of the Supreme Court of the 
United States as an agent of progressive social change”); Diane P. Wood, Legal 
Scholarship for Judges, 124 YALE L.J. 2529 (2015) (discussing the disconnect 
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  APPENDIX A   
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
Case Holding Field Effect Vote 
Halo Electronics 
v. Pulse Elec-
tronics, 136 S. 
Ct. 1923 (2016) 
Enhanced damages 
for willful infringe-
ment are available for 
egregious activity “be-
yond typical infringe-
ment.” 
Patent Strength-
ens 
8–0 
Cuozzo Speed 
Techs., L.L.C. v. 
Lee, 136 S. Ct. 
2131 (2016) 
Decision to institute 
IPR is unreviewable; 
PTO may apply 
broadest reasonable 
construction to patent 
claims in IPR. 
Patent Weakens 8–0 
Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 136 
S. Ct. 1979 
(2016) 
Attorney’s fees deci-
sions consider all cir-
cumstances, including 
objective reasonable-
ness of losing party’s 
position. 
Copy-
right 
Neutral 8–0 
Kimble v. Mar-
vel Entm’t, 
LLC, 135 S. Ct. 
2401 (2015) 
A patent holder can-
not charge royalties 
for the use of an in-
vention after the pa-
tent has expired. 
Patent Weakens 6–3 
Commil USA, 
L.L.C. v. Cisco 
Systems, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 1920 
(2015) 
Accused infringer’s 
subjective belief that 
a patent is invalid is 
not a defense to an in-
duced infringement 
claim. 
Patent Strength-
ens 
6–2 
 
between legal scholarship and the judicial decision-making process); The Hon-
orable John G. Roberts Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Conversa-
tion at Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, C-SPAN (June 25, 2011), https:// 
c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts&start=694 (com-
menting that legal scholarship plays little to no role in judicial decision-mak-
ing). Contra Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 
32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2–9, 42) (arguing 
that prevalent views among legal scholars are cited by courts and other policy-
makers). 
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B & B Hard-
ware, Inc. v. 
Hargis Indus., 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
1293 (2015) 
TTAB adjudication 
precludes a party 
from arguing the 
same issues before a 
district court. 
Trade-
mark 
Neutral 7–2 
Hana Fin., Inc. 
v. Hana Bank, 
135 S. Ct. 907 
(2015) 
Whether an older 
trademark can be 
tacked to a newer one 
for priority purposes 
is a question of fact. 
Trade-
mark 
Neutral 9–0 
Teva Pharms. 
USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 831 
(2015) 
District court resolu-
tion of subsidiary 
facts in claim con-
struction is reviewed 
for clear error. 
Patent Neutral 7–2 
American 
Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc. 
v. Aereo, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2498 
(2014) 
Retransmission of a 
television broadcast 
over the Internet is a 
public performance 
for purposes of the 
Copyright Act. 
Copy-
right 
Strength-
ens 
6–3 
Alice Corp. v. 
CLS Bank Int’l, 
134 S. Ct. 2347 
(2014) 
A computer-imple-
mented method for 
exchanging financial 
obligations is a pa-
tent-ineligible ab-
stract idea. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Limelight Net-
works, Inc. v. 
Akamai Techs., 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2111 (2014) 
No liability for induc-
ing patent infringe-
ment where steps 
were not performed 
by a single party. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Nautilus, Inc. v. 
Biosig Instru-
ments, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2120 
(2014) 
Ambiguous patent 
claims with multiple 
reasonable interpreta-
tions are indefinite. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Petrella v. 
Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 1962 
(2014) 
Laches do not bar in-
fringement action 
brought within Copy-
right Act’s statute of 
limitations. 
Copy-
right 
Strength-
ens 
6–3 
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Octane Fitness 
v. Icon Health 
and Fitness, 134 
S. Ct. 1749 
(2014) 
An “exceptional case” 
for fee-shifting pur-
poses is one that 
stands out with re-
spect to a party’s liti-
gation. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Highmark, Inc. 
v. Allcare 
Health Mgmt. 
Sys., Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1744 (2014) 
A district court’s de-
termination that a 
case is exceptional is 
reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. 
Patent Neutral 9–0 
Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Mirowski 
Family Ven-
tures, L.L.C., 
134 S. Ct. 843 
(2014) 
The patentee bears 
the burden of persua-
sion when a licensee 
seeks a declaratory 
judgment of nonin-
fringement. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Federal Trade 
Commission v. 
Actavis, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2223 
(2013) 
Patent case reverse 
payment settlements 
may unreasonably di-
minish competition in 
violation of antitrust 
laws. 
Patent Weakens 5–3 
Ass’n for Molec-
ular Pathology 
v. Myriad Ge-
netics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107 
(2013) 
Isolated DNA se-
quences are not pa-
tent eligible products 
of nature. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Bowman v. 
Monsanto Co., 
569 U.S. 278 
(2013) 
Patent exhaustion 
does not permit the 
reproduction of le-
gally purchased, pa-
tented seeds. 
Patent Strength-
ens 
9–0 
Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 568 
U.S. 519 (2013) 
The first-sale doctrine 
applies to copies of 
copyrighted works 
that are lawfully ac-
quired abroad. 
Copy-
right 
Weakens 6–3 
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Gunn v. Minton, 
568 U.S. 251 
(2013) 
State courts can have 
jurisdiction over 
claims alleging legal 
malpractice in a pa-
tent case. 
Patent Neutral 9–0 
Already L.L.C. 
d/b/a Yums v. 
Nike, Inc., 568 
U.S. 85 (2013) 
A trademark owner’s 
covenant not to sue a 
defendant deprives 
the court of Article III 
jurisdiction. 
Trade-
mark 
Strength-
ens 
9–0 
Kappos v. Hy-
att, 566 U.S. 
431 (2012) 
There are no particu-
lar limitations on a 
patent applicant’s 
ability to introduce 
new evidence in a sec-
tion 145 proceeding. 
Patent Strength-
ens 
9–0 
Caraco Pharm. 
Labs., Ltd. v. 
Novo Nordisk 
A/S, 566 U.S. 
399 (2012) 
Generic drug manu-
facturer can assert a 
counterclaim chal-
lenging patentee’s 
product description as 
overbroad. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Mayo Collabora-
tive Servs. v. 
Prometheus 
Labs., Inc, 566 
U.S. 66 (2012) 
Claims directed to 
drug administration 
decision are not pa-
tent-eligible subject 
matter natural laws. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Golan v. Holder, 
565 U.S. 302 
(2012) 
Restoring copyright 
status to certain for-
eign works did not vi-
olate the Copyright 
Clause of the Consti-
tution. 
Copy-
right 
Strength-
ens 
6–2 
Microsoft Corp. 
v. i4i Ltd. 
P’ship, 564 U.S. 
91 (2011) 
An invalidity defense 
to patent infringe-
ment must be proved 
by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 
Patent Strength-
ens 
8–0 
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Bd. of Tr. of Le-
land Stanford 
Junior Univ. v. 
Roche Molecular 
Sys., Inc., 563 
U.S. 776 (2011) 
Bayh–Dole Act does 
not automatically con-
fer federally-funded 
inventions to federal 
contractors. 
Patent Neutral 7–2 
Global-Tech Ap-
pliances, Inc. v. 
SEB S.A., 563 
U.S. 754 (2011) 
Induced infringement 
requires knowledge of 
infringement, which 
can include willful 
blindness to infringe-
ment. 
Patent Neutral 8–1 
Costco Whole-
sale Corp. v. 
Omega S.A., 562 
U.S. 40 (2010) 
[Split vote; did not de-
cide effect of first sale 
doctrine on foreign 
goods]. 
Copy-
right 
Neutral 4–4 
Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 561 U.S. 
593 (2010) 
Method of hedging 
losses is not patent-el-
igible subject matter 
as an abstract idea. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Reed Elsevier, 
Inc. v. Much-
nick, 559 U.S. 
154 (2010) 
Federal court has ju-
risdiction over in-
fringement claims 
concerning unregis-
tered works. 
Copy-
right 
Strength-
ens 
5–3 
Quanta Com-
puter, Inc. v. LG 
Elecs., Inc., 553 
U.S. 617 (2008) 
Patent exhaustion ap-
plies to sale of compo-
nent that embodies a 
patent’s essential fea-
tures. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., 
550 U.S. 398 
(2007) 
Prior art may be com-
bined in the nonobvi-
ousness analysis 
where there was a 
reason to combine. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Microsoft Corp. 
v. AT&T Corp., 
550 U.S. 437 
(2007) 
There is no U.S. lia-
bility for export of 
master disk to install 
U.S. patented soft-
ware on foreign com-
puters. 
Patent Weakens 7–1 
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MedImmune, 
Inc. v. Genen-
tech, Inc., 549 
U.S. 118 (2007) 
A licensee need not 
terminate or breach 
its license prior to 
seeking declaratory 
judgment of patent in-
validity. 
Patent Weakens 8–1 
eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006) 
The traditional four-
factor test applies to 
determine the award 
of a permanent in-
junction for patent in-
fringement. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
Unitherm Food 
Sys., Inc. v. 
Swift-Eckrich, 
Inc., 546 U.S. 
394 (2006) 
Party’s failure to 
move for a new trial 
after verdict pre-
cludes it from seeking 
one for insufficiency 
of the evidence. 
Patent Neutral 7–2 
Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913 (2005) 
Distribution of a de-
vice with the object of 
promoting its use to 
infringe creates liabil-
ity for infringement 
by third-parties. 
Copy-
right 
Strength-
ens 
9–0 
Merck KGaA v. 
Integra Lifesci-
ences I, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 193 
(2005) 
Use of patented com-
pounds in preclinical 
studies is exempt 
from infringement lia-
bility if they may be 
subject of FDA sub-
mission. 
Patent Weakens 9–0 
K.P. Permanent 
Make-Up, Inc. 
v. Lasting Im-
pression I, Inc., 
543 U.S. 111 
(2004) 
Fair use defense does 
not require a party to 
demonstrate an ab-
sence of a likelihood 
of confusion. 
Trade-
mark 
Weakens 9–0 
Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox Film 
Corp., 539 U.S. 
23 (2003) 
Lanham Act does not 
prevent the unaccred-
ited copying of an un-
copyrighted work. 
Trade-
mark 
Weakens 9–0 
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Moseley v. V Se-
cret Catalogue, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 
418 (2003) 
Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act (FTDA) 
requires a showing of 
actual dilution, not 
simply a likelihood of 
dilution. 
Trade-
mark 
Weakens 9–0 
Eldred v. Ash-
croft, 537 U.S. 
186 (2003) 
Copyright Term Ex-
tension Act does not 
violate the Constitu-
tion’s “limited times” 
requirement. 
Copy-
right 
Strength-
ens 
7–2 
 
  APPENDIX B   
CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 
Name of Law Primary Effects Field Effect 
Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 
2016, Pub. L. 
No. 114-153, 130 
Stat. 376 
Creates a private cause of 
action for trade secret theft 
in federal court; remedies in-
clude seizure to prevent fur-
ther dissemination. 
Trade Se-
cret 
Strength-
ens 
Trade Facilita-
tion and Trade 
Enforcement Act 
of 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 114-125, 130 
Stat. 122 
Enables the DHS to better 
restrict, coordinate activity 
on, and provide information 
on the import and export of 
goods that infringe copy-
rights. 
Copyright Strength-
ens 
    
Trade Facilita-
tion and Trade 
Enforcement Act 
of 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 114-125, 130 
Stat. 122 
Enables the DHS to better 
restrict, coordinate activity 
on, and provide information 
on the import and export of 
goods that infringe trade-
marks. 
Trade-
mark 
Strength-
ens 
Collectible Coin 
Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 113-
288, 128 Stat. 
3281 (2014) 
Enhances trademark owner 
rights in connection with un-
authorized, trademark in-
fringing, collectibles. 
Trade-
mark 
Strength-
ens 
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Pub. L. No. 113-
227, 128 Stat. 
2114 (2014) 
Allows certain law students 
to practice patent law before 
the USPTO on a pro-bono 
basis.  
Patent Neutral 
Pub. L. No. 113-
227, 128 Stat. 
2114 (2014) 
Allows certain law students 
to practice trademark law 
before the USPTO on a pro-
bono basis. 
Trade-
mark 
Neutral 
STELA Reau-
thorization Act 
of 2014, Pub. L. 
No. 113-200, 128 
Stat. 2060 
Extends provisions of the 
Satellite Television Exten-
sion and Localism Act 
through 2019.  
Copyright Neutral 
An Act to correct 
and improve . . . 
provisions of 
Leahy-Smith 
America Invents 
Act and title 35 
. . ., Pub. L. No. 
112-274, 126 
Stat. 2456  
(2013) 
Administrative and funding 
adjustments at the PTO; 
technical changes to transi-
tional program for covered 
business method patents 
and joinder of parties. 
Patent Neutral 
An Act to correct 
and improve . . . 
provisions of 
Leahy-Smith 
America Invents 
Act and title 35 
. . ., Pub. L. No. 
112-274, 126 
Stat. 2456  
(2013) 
Administrative funding ad-
justments at the PTO, in-
cluding using patent and 
trademark fees interchange-
ably to cover proportionate 
PTO costs. 
Trade-
mark 
Neutral 
Foreign and 
Economic Espio-
nage Penalty 
Enhancement 
Act of 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-
269, 126 Stat. 
2442 
Increased the fines available 
as penalties for economic es-
pionage. 
Trade Se-
cret 
Strength-
ens 
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Theft of Trade 
Secrets Clarifi-
cation Act of 
2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-236, 126 
Stat. 1627 
Prohibits the theft of trade 
secrets taken for intended 
(not just actual) use and ex-
pands the definition of a 
trade secret to include infor-
mation related to services. 
Trade Se-
cret 
Strength-
ens 
Leahy-Smith 
America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011) 
Myriad changes, including 
shifting from a “first to in-
vent” to a “first inventor to 
file” system and developing 
new post-grant oppositions. 
Patent Mixed 
(see Part 
I.B.4) 
Leahy-Smith 
America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011) 
Minor changes to trademark 
law concerning administra-
tion at the PTO.  
Trade-
mark 
Neutral 
Copyright 
Cleanup, Clarifi-
cation, and Cor-
rections Act of 
2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-295, 124 
Stat. 3180 
Among other amendments, 
provides that distribution of 
a phonorecord before 1978 is 
not publication of the work 
embodied therein. 
Copyright Strength-
ens 
Satellite Televi-
sion Extension 
and Localism 
Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-
175, 124 Stat. 
1218 
Updated and reauthorized 
satellite carrier and cable 
statutory licenses in part to 
account for digital broadcast 
television transition.  
Copyright Neutral 
Continuing Ex-
tension Act of 
2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-157, 124 
Stat. 1116 
Amended Communications 
Act of 1934 to extend mora-
torium on copyright liability 
for certain subscribers of 
satellite TV.  
Copyright Neutral 
Trademark 
Technical and 
Conforming 
Amendment Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-146, 124 
Stat. 66 
Among other changes, per-
mits trademark owners to 
correct certain deficiencies 
in post registration mainte-
nance. 
Trade-
mark 
Strength-
ens 
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Temporary Ex-
tension Act of 
2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-144, 124 
Stat. 42 
Amended Communications 
Act of 1934 to extend mora-
torium on copyright liability 
for certain subscribers of 
satellite TV.  
Copyright Neutral 
Department of 
Defense Appro-
priations Act, 
2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-118, 123 
Stat. 3409 
Extended provisions of Copy-
right Act and Communica-
tions Act permitting satellite 
television providers to re-
transmit certain network 
programming. 
Copyright Neutral 
United States 
Capital Police 
Administrative 
Technical Cor-
rections Act of 
2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-145, 124 
Stat. 49 
Authorizes the Director of 
the USPTO to shift funds 
from trademark registra-
tions to patent activities un-
der certain conditions. 
Trade-
mark 
Neutral 
United States 
Capital Police 
Administrative 
Technical Cor-
rections Act of 
2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-145, 124 
Stat. 49 
Authorizes the Director of 
the USPTO to shift funds 
from trademark registra-
tions to patent activities un-
der certain conditions. 
Patent Neutral 
Webcaster Set-
tlement Act of 
2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-36, 123 
Stat. 1926 
Defines “webcaster’ for pro-
visions relating to sound re-
cordings via webcasting. 
Copyright Neutral 
Webcaster Set-
tlement Act of 
2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-435, 122 
Stat. 4974 
Allows internet radio sta-
tions and streaming services 
to negotiate rates directly 
with record companies. 
Copyright Neutral 
Vessel Hull De-
sign Protection 
Amendments of 
2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-434, 122 
Stat. 4972 
Amends copyright law to 
specify that the design of a 
vessel's hull, deck, or combi-
nation is copyright pro-
tected. 
Copyright Strength-
ens 
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Prioritizing Re-
sources and Or-
ganization for 
Intellectual 
Property Act of 
2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-403, 122 
Stat. 4256 
Prohibits the transshipment 
or exportation of counterfeit 
goods under the Lanham Act 
and increases trademark sei-
zure damages provisions. 
Trade-
mark 
Strength-
ens 
Prioritizing Re-
sources and Or-
ganization for 
Intellectual 
Property Act of 
2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-403, 122 
Stat. 4256 
Created a safe harbor for 
registration errors, allows 
impoundment of records dur-
ing infringement action, pro-
hibits export of copies with-
out permission.  
Copyright Strength-
ens 
A bill to amend 
title 35, United 
States Code and 
the Trademark 
Act of 1946 . . ., 
Pub. L. No. 110-
313, 122 Stat. 
3014 (2008) 
Transferred authority to ap-
point administrative patent 
judges from the Director of 
the PTO to the Secretary of 
Commerce. 
Patent Neutral 
A bill to amend 
title 35, United 
States Code and 
the Trademark 
Act of 1946 . . ., 
Pub. L. No. 110-
313, 122 Stat. 
3014 (2008) 
Transferred authority to ap-
point administrative trade-
mark judges from the Direc-
tor of the PTO to the 
Secretary of Commerce. 
Trade-
mark 
Neutral 
Trademark Di-
lution Revision 
Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-
312, 120 Stat. 
1730 
Amended trademark dilu-
tion law to allow actions 
based on likelihood of dilu-
tion and clarify famous mark 
definition as based on gen-
eral public. 
Trade-
mark 
Strength-
ens 
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Copyright Roy-
alty Judges Pro-
gram Technical 
Corrections Act, 
Pub. L. No. 109-
303, 120 Stat. 
1478 (2006) 
Amends administrative pro-
visions concerning Copyright 
Royalty Judges, including 
that they are subject to the 
Administrative Procedure 
Act. 
Copyright Neutral 
Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-
58, 119 Stat. 594 
Concerns the Office of Scien-
tific and Technical Infor-
mation; rare instances for 
Department of Energy acqui-
sition of background intellec-
tual property. 
Patent Neutral 
Family Enter-
tainment and 
Copyright Act of 
2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-9, 119 
Stat. 218 
Increases penalties for copy-
right infringement to pre-
vent filming movies in thea-
ters and unlicensed early 
release of movies and soft-
ware. 
Copyright Strength-
ens 
Intellectual 
Property Protec-
tion and Courts 
Amendments 
Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-
482, 118 Stat. 
3912 
Lowers standard for willful 
copyright infringement con-
cerning domain name regis-
tration; increases penalties 
regarding counterfeit goods. 
Copyright Strength-
ens 
Intellectual 
Property Protec-
tion and Courts 
Amendments 
Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-
482, 118 Stat. 
3912 
Lowers standard for willful 
trademark infringement con-
cerning domain name regis-
tration. 
Trade-
mark 
Strength-
ens 
Cooperative Re-
search and 
Technology En-
hancement 
(CREATE) Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-453, 118 
Stat. 3596 
Provides that patentability 
is not precluded by obvious-
ness for certain situations 
involving team research un-
der joint research agree-
ments. 
Patent Strength-
ens 
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Satellite Home 
Viewer Exten-
sion and Reau-
thorization Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-447, 118 
Stat. 3393 
Extends and expands provi-
sions of the Satellite Home 
Viewer Improvement Act to 
facilitate satellite television 
industry's transition to digi-
tal signals. 
Copyright Neutral 
Individuals with 
Disabilities Edu-
cation Improve-
ment Act (IDEA) 
of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-446, 118 
Stat. 2647 
Exempts from copyright lia-
bility certain instructional 
materials for individuals 
with disabilities used in ele-
mentary or secondary 
schools.  
Copyright Weakens 
Copyright Roy-
alty and Distri-
bution Reform 
Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-
419, 118 Stat. 
2341 
Replaced the royalty arbitra-
tion process with three per-
manent Copyright Royalty 
Judges to be appointed by 
the Librarian of Congress. 
Copyright Neutral 
An Act to im-
prove the United 
States Code, 
Pub. L. No. 108-
178, 117 Stat. 
2637 (2003) 
Minor administrative 
amendments concerning the 
PTO.  
Patent Neutral 
Medicare Pre-
scription Drug, 
Improvement, 
and Moderniza-
tion Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-
173, 117 Stat. 
2066 
Requires more detailed 
statements for paragraph IV 
abbreviated new drug appli-
cation certifications and lim-
its amendment opportuni-
ties. 
Patent Strength-
ens 
Small Webcaster 
Settlement Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-321, 116 
Stat. 2780 
Allows small webcasters and 
copyright holders to enter 
voluntary licenses and per-
mits SoundExchange to ne-
gotiate on behalf of copyright 
holders. 
Copyright Neutral 
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21st Century 
Department of 
Justice Appro-
priations Au-
thorization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-
273, 116 Stat. 
1758 (2002) 
Reauthorized the PTO and 
clarified that third-party re-
questers can invoke inter 
partes reexamination in 
light of new evidence. 
Patent Neutral 
21st Century 
Department of 
Justice Appro-
priations Au-
thorization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-
273, 116 Stat. 
1758 (2002) 
In addition to new reporting 
requirements, extended an 
exemption from copyright li-
ability for instructional 
broadcasting to distance 
learning. 
Copyright Weakens 
 
